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Drugging Children: A Cruel Sign of the Times
|
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| Jan Drew 2006-06-24, 4:27 pm |
| http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-6-18/42892.html
Drugging Children: A Cruel Sign of the Times
Excerpts:
Why the need for a black box warning? It depends on who is giving the
opinion. For instance, a report from the Mayo Clinic agrees that ADHD
medications can cause heart attack, stroke, hypertension, heart
palpitations, an irregular heartbeat, psychosis, mania, aggressive behavior
and hallucinations. Some deaths have also been linked to these drugs. This
should scare the hell out of any parent. But Mayo claims the risks are small
and benefits outweigh these potential problems.
Dr. Colleen Clements, a psychiatrist at the university of Rochester, in
Rochester, N.Y., writes in The Medical Post that ADHD is a disease with
"dubious scientific merit." She worries that "long-term psychoactive
medication does not allow the developmental process to continue normally and
children may be causally put in this illness category with the implied
degrading of their normality and worth."
Adding to these concerns, Dr. Nadine Lambert, a developmental psychiatrist
at the university of California, reports that children on Ritalin are three
times more likely to develop a taste for cocaine.
Remember that just because drugs are prescribed, it does not make them safe.
And shouldn't we ask why 90 percent of ADHD drugs manufactured in the world
are used in Canada and the United States? Isn't it strange that the rest of
the world can manage children in the classroom without drugging them?
Dr. Laurence Diller, author of the book, "Running on Ritalin" writes, "We
prefer to locate our children's problems in their brain rather than in their
lives."
Surely it makes more sense to treat the cause, rather than expose children
to powerful drugs with drastic side effects. Hell should freeze over before
we allow this to happen.
Dr. Gifford-Jones is a medical journalist and has a private medical practice
in Toronto.
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|
|
| Joe Parsons 2006-06-24, 9:25 pm |
| On Sun, 25 Jun 2006 00:37:17 GMT, Peter Bowditch <myfirstname@ratbags.com>
wrote:
>"Jan Drew" <jdrew1374@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>
>
>Does your pastor approve of you citing a Falun Gong publication, Jan,
>or is this a case, as with Scientology, of "the enemy of my enemy is
>my friend"?
One has to wonder where there is a reference to "Peter Breggin, a renowned
researcher in this field." It would have been far more accurate (but less
telling) to say, "Peter Breggin, discredited professional witness."
Joe Parsons
| |
| Jan Drew 2006-06-25, 2:29 am |
|
"Joe Parsons" <asad@yankeemedia.n3t> wrote in message
news:rpmr929alacv4i09jt30mqnp1naftjr5gs@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 25 Jun 2006 00:37:17 GMT, Peter Bowditch <myfirstname@ratbags.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> One has to wonder where there is a reference to "Peter Breggin, a renowned
> researcher in this field." It would have been far more accurate (but less
> telling) to say, "Peter Breggin, discredited professional witness."
>
> Joe Parsons
Hello Joe. Still have NOT proven the ADHD myths (spoken of in recent
discussion) were
written by you.
GOD BLESS DR BREGGIN.
http://www.breggin.com/courtfiling.pbreggin.2006.html
Suppressed Paxil Suicide Data Released
Expert Calls for Drug Companies to Publish Safety and Efficacy Data
February 27, 2006, Ithaca, New York
Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry (EHPP) has published an
excerpt from a previously sealed product liability report against Glaxo
SmithKline (GSK). The medical expert report documents how the company
systematically hid and manipulated data concerning Paxil-induced suicidality
in depressed adults. The number of suicide attempts on the antidepressant
Paxil was under-reported and the number of suicide attempts on placebo was
inflated.
The entire product liability report is reproduced on www.breggin.com.
It further documents how GSK hid the incidence of Paxil-induced akathisia
(agitation with hyperactivity) and stimulation. Akathisia and stimulation
are risks factors for suicidality and violence. The product liability
report also cites previously unreleased FDA correspondence critical of GSK's
marketing and advertising tactics in regard to Paxil.
The excerpts were published as part of a Special Report by Peter R.
Breggin, M.D. in Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry (Volume 8, Spring
2006, pp. 77-84). Dr. Breggin's original psychiatric expert report was
written for Lacuzong v. GSK and signed as an affidavit in California on July
21, 2001. It was based on a three-day examination of GSK's sealed files at
the company headquarters.
The Lacuzong case was brought by the widow of a man who drowned their
two children and himself in a tub after taking Paxil for three days. The
attorney was Don Farber of San Rafael, California.
The Lacuzong case was "resolved" to the satisfaction of the family;
the drug company denied all allegations. At GSK's insistence, Dr. Breggin's
report remained sealed. However, in a more recent case against the company,
Moffett v. Glaxo SmithKline, the United States District Court for the South
District of Mississippi, the report was filed in the public record and is
now available at the court as well as on www.breggin.com.
The FDA has recently issued a preliminary warning that newer
antidepressants like Paxil may cause increased suicidality in adult
patients. The FDA is planning further scientific review but, as this special
report indicates, drug companies do not always reveal critical data to the
agency.
Dr. Breggin stated, "The drug companies settle almost all legal cases
brought against them in order to seal incriminating scientific data. This
deprives the FDA, medical profession and public of critical information on
drug safety and efficacy. The publication of a previously sealed medical
expert report is a rare event-the first in my experience. The law should be
changed to require drug companies to publish all of the safety and efficacy
data they generate in regard to their drug products."
http://www.breggin.com/
Bibliography of Peter R. Breggin, M.D.
The bibliography is divided into the following three sections:
I. 19 professional books
II. 30 peer-reviewed articles
III. Many other professional publications such as articles, reviews,
letters, and book chapters.
I. PROFESSIONAL BOOKS
1. college Students in a Mental Hospital: Contribution to the Social
Rehabilitation of the Mentally Ill. New York, Grune & Stratton, 1962
(jointly authored by Carter Umbarger, James Dalsimer, Andrew Morrison, and
Peter Breggin).
2. Electroshock: Its Brain-Disabling Effects. New York, Springer
Publishing Company, 1979. Translated into French, German &
Italian. Behavioral Sciences book club selection.
3. The Psychology of Freedom: Liberty and Love as a Way of Life .
Buffalo, Prometheus Books, 1980.
4. Psychiatric Drugs: Hazards to the Brain. New York, Springer
Publishing Company, 1983.
5. Toxic Psychiatry: Why Therapy, Empathy and Love Must Replace the Drugs,
Electroshock and Biochemical Theories of the "New Psychiatry" New York,
St. Martin's Press, 1991. Psychotherapy
Book Club selection. Special English edition with an introduction by
Dorothy Rowe. Harper/Collins, London, 1993. St. Martin's paperback, 1994.
Also translated into German.
6. Beyond Conflict: From Self-Help and Psychotherapy to Peacemaking New
York, St. Martin's Press (scholarly division), 1992. St. Martin's
paperback, 1995.
7. Talking Back to Prozac (Coauthored by Ginger Breggin) New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1994. St. Martin's Press, 1994. St. Martin's paperback,
1994.
8. Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Patients. Senior Editor,
Peter Breggin. Co-editor, E. Mark Stern. New York: Haworth Press. Also
published as The Psychotherapy Patient, Volume 9, Numbers 3/4, 1996.
9. The War Against Children: How the Drugs, Programs, and Theories of the
Psychiatric Establishment Are Threatening America's Children with a Medical
"Cure" for Violence. Coauthored by Ginger Breggin. New York, St. Martin's
Press, 1994.
10. Brain-Disabling Treatments in Psychiatry. New York: Springer Publishing
Company, 1997.
11. The Heart of Being Helpful: Empathy and the Creation of a Healing
Presence. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1997.
12. Talking Back to Ritalin. (first edition) Monroe, Maine: Common Courage
Press, 1998.
13. The War Against Children of Color. (revised edition). Coauthored by
Ginger Breggin. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1998.
14. Your Drug May Be Your Problem: How and Why To Stop Taking Psychiatric
Medications. Co-authored by David Cohen, Ph.D. Reading, MA: Perseus Books,
1999.
15. Reclaiming Our Children: A Healing Solution for a National In Crisis.
Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000.
16. Talking Back to Ritalin. (revised edition). Cambridge, MA: Perseus
Books, 2000.
17. The Antidepressant Fact Book. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2001
18. Dimensions of Empathic Therapy. Co-edited by Ginger Breggin and Fred
Bemak, Ed.D. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2002.
19. The Ritalin Fact Book. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002.
II. PEER REVIEWED ARTICLES
1. "The Psychophysiology of Anxiety." Journal of Nervous Mental Diseases
139:558-568, 1964.
2. "Coercion of Voluntary Patients in an Open Hospital." Archives of
General Psychiatry 10:173-181, 1964. Reprinted with a new introduction in
Edwards, R.B. (ed): Psychiatry and Ethics. Buffalo, Prometheus Books, 1982,
and in Edwards, R.B. (ed): Ethics of Psychiatry. Amherst, New York,
Prometheus Books, 1997.
3. "The Sedative-like Effect of Epinephrine." Archives of General
Psychiatry 12:255-259, 1965.
4. "Psychotherapy as Applied Ethics." Psychiatry 34:59-75, 1971.
5. "Therapy As Applied Utopian Politics." Mental Health and Society
1:129-146, 1974.
6. "Psychiatry and Psychotherapy as Political Processes." American Journal
of Psychotherapy 29:369-382, 1975.
7. "Madness is a Failure of Free Will; Therapy Too Often Encourages It."
Psychiatric Quarterly 53:61-68, 1981.
Originally published (in French) in Verdiglione A (ed): La Folie Dans La
Psychoanalyse. Paris, Payot, 1977.
8. "Electroshock Therapy and Brain Damage: The Acute Organic Brain Syndrome
as Treatment." Behavior and Brain Sciences 7:24-25, 1984 (commentary).
9. "Neuropathology and Cognitive Dysfunction from ECT." Psychopharmacology
Bulletin 22:476-479, 1986.
10. "Ellettroshock: Tra Rischioiatrogeno e Mito Terapeutico." (P. Breggin
and G. de Girolamo) Quaderni Italiani di Psychiatrica 6:497-540, 1987.
11. "The Three Dynamics of Human Progress: A Unified Theory Applicable to
Individuals, Institutions and Society." Review of Existential Psychology
and Psychiatry 21 Nos. 1-3)97-123, 1988-89.
12. "Precious the Crow." Voices (Journal of the American Academy of
Psychotherapists) 23:32-42, Summer, 1987.
13. "Brain Damage, Dementia and Persistent Cognitive Dysfunction Associated
with Neuroleptic Drugs: Evidence, Etiology, Implications." Journal of Mind
Behavior 11:425-464, 1990.
14. "Psychotherapy in the Shadow of the Psycho-Pharmaceutical Complex,"
Voices (journal of the American Academy of Psychotherapists) 27:15-21, 1991
15. "A Case of Fluoxetine-induced Stimulant Side Effects with Suicidal
Ideation Associated with a Possible Withdrawal Syndrome ("Crashing")."
International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine 3:325-328, 1992
16. "Parallels Between Neuroleptic Effects and Lethargic Encephalitis: The
Production of Dyskinesias and Cognitive disorders." Brain and Cognition
23:8-27, 1993.
17. "A Biomedical Programme for Urban Violence Control in the US: The
Dangers of Psychiatric Social Control." (Peter Breggin and Ginger Ross
Breggin). Changes: An International Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy
11, No. 1 (March):59-71, 1993.
18. "Psychiatry's Role in the Holocaust." International Journal of Risk and
Safety in Medicine 4:133-148, 1993. Adapted from a paper delivered at
"Medical Science Without Compassion" in Cologne, Germany and published in
the conference proceedings.
19. "Should the Use of Neuroleptics Be Severely Limited?" Changes: An
International Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy 14:62-66 March 1996.
20. "The Hazards of Treating 'Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder' with
Methylphenidate (Ritalin)" (Coauthored by Ginger Breggin) Journal of
College Student Psychotherapy 10:55-72, 1996.
21. "Psychotherapy in Emotional Crises without Resort to Psychiatric
Medication." The Humanistic Psychologist 25:2-14, 1998.
22. "Analysis of Adverse Behavioral Effects of Benzodiazepines with a
Discussion of Drawing Scientific Conclusions from the FDA's Spontaneous
Reporting System." Journal of Mind and Behavior 19:21-50, 1998.
23. "Electroshock: Scientific, ethical, and political issues."
International Journal of Risk & Safety In Medicine 11:5-40, 1998.
24. "Psychostimulants in the treatment of children diagnosed with ADHD: Part
I-Acute risks and psychological effects." Ethical Human Sciences and
Services 1:13-33, 1999.
25. "Psychostimulants in the treatment of children diagnosed with ADHD: Part
II-Adverse effects on brain and behavior." Ethical Human Sciences and
Services 1:213-241, 1999.
26. "Psychostimulants in the treatment of children diagnosed with ADHD:
Risks and mechanism of action." International Journal of Risk and Safety in
Medicine, 12 (1), 3-35, 1999.
(Simultaneously published version of #'s 24 and 25)
27. "What psychologists and psychotherapists need to know about ADHD and
stimulants." Changes: An International Journal of Psychology and
Psychotherapy 18:13-23, Spring 2000
28. "The NIMH multimodal study of treatment for
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: A critical analysis."
International Journal of Risk and Safety in Medicine 13:15-22, 2000
29. "Empathic self-transformation and love in individual and family
therapy." Humanistic Psychologist, 27:267-282, 1999.
30. "Fluvoxamine as a cause of stimulation, mania, and aggression with a
critical analysis of the FDA-approved label." International Journal of Risk
and Safety in Medicine, 2002, in press.
III. OTHER ARTICLES, REPORTS, LETTERS, AND BOOK CHAPTERS
"Schizophrenia as nondependency." Hutchings Journal (Department of
Psychiatry, State university of New York, Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse).
Vol. l, No. 2, pp. 1-3, December 1962.
"The college student and the mental patient." In college Student Companion
Program: Contribution to the Social Rehabilitation of the Mentally Ill.
Rockville, Maryland; National Institute of Mental Health, 1962.
"The psychophysiology of anxiety applied to the effect of adrenaline on rat
behavior." Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Medicine, Western Reserve School of Medicine, 1962.
Portions published in the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease (1964) and
the Archives of General Psychiatry (1965) (see list of peer reviewed
articles).
"The borderland of criminal justice." (book review and commentary) Journal
of Nervous and Mental Diseases 141:387-394, 1965.
"Lobotomy is still bad medicine." Medical Opinion 8:3236, 1972.
"Lobotomies: an alert." (letter) American Journal of Psychiatry 129:98-99,
1972.
"The politics of therapy." M/H (Mental Health) 56:9-13,1972.
"Lobotomy." (co-authored by Daniel Greenberg). Science and Government
Policy, March 15, 1972, Volume II, No. 2, p. !.
"Psychosurgery." (letter) Journal of the American Medical Association
226:1121, 1973.
"The second wave of psychosurgery." M/H (Mental Health) 57:10-13, 1973.
"Psychiatric oppression of prisoners." (coauthored by PL Breggin).
Psychiatric Opinion, June, 1974
"Psychosurgery for political purposes." Duquesne Law Review 13:841-862,
1975.
"Psychosurgery for the control of violence: a critical review." Chapter IV
in Fields W, Sweet W (eds): Neural Bases of Violence and Aggression . St.
Louis, Warren H. Green Publisher, 1975.
"If psychosurgery is wrong in principle...?" Psychiatric Opinion ,
November/December 1977.
"La seconde vague. A propos de la lobotomie." In Verdiglione A (ed): La
Folie II: Actes Due Colloque De Milan, 1976. Paris, Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli, 1977.
"Brain-disabling therapies." In Valenstein E (ed): The Psychosurgery
Debate. San Francisco, WH Freeman, 1980.
"Disabling the brain with electroshock." In Dongier M, Wittkower ED (eds):
Divergent Views in Psychiatry. Hagerstown, Maryland; Harper and Row, 1981.
"Psychosurgery as brain-disabling therapy." In Dongier M, Wittkower D
(eds): Divergent Views in Psychiatry. Hagerstown, Maryland; Harper and Row,
1981.
"Compulsion as a spiritual disorder." (co-authored by J. Kasmir) Newsletter
of the Washington Branch of the Association for Humanistic Psychology .
Washington, D.C., October, 1982.
"The return of lobotomy and psychosurgery." Reprinted with a new
introduction in Edwards RB (ed): Psychiatry and Ethics. Buffalo, Prometheus
Books, 1982. Originally published in the Congressional Record , February
24, 1972, E1602-E1612. First reprinted in Quality of Health Care-Human
Experimentation: Hearings Before Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Health, US Senate, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1973.
"Testimony on electroshock treatment" before the Respiratory and Nervous
System Devices Panel, Volume II, Food and Drug Administration, Department of
Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, November 4, 1982.
"What cost leukotomy?" (letter) American Journal of Psychiatry 140:1101,
1983.
"Iatrogenic helplessness in authoritarian psychiatry." In Morgan RF (ed):
The Iatrogenics Handbook. Toronto, IPI Publishing Company, 1983.
"Neuropathology and cognitive dysfunction from ECT." Presented at the
Consensus Development Conference on Electroconvulsive Therapy, sponsored by
NIMH and NIH, 1985.
"Brain damage from nondominant ECT." (letter) American Journal Psychiatry
143:1320-1, 1986.
"Workshop on medication." In CSP: Choices and Challenges. Proceedings of
the Seventh National Conference of the Community Support Program of the
National Institute of Mental Health, 1985. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, Maryland
1986, pp. 92-95.
"Point-Counterpoint: Is electroconvulsive therapy outmoded?" Physicians
Weekly April 21, 1986.
"Sex and love: sexual dysfunction as a spiritual disorder." In Shelp EE
(ed): Sexuality and Medicine. Boston, D. Reidel, 1987.
"A hierarchy of values for evaluating human progress on an individual,
institutional and societal basis," in Kollenda K (ed): Ethical Individualism
and Organizations . New York, Praeger, 1988.
"Debate over euthanasia termed reminiscent of pre-Nazi Germany," Clinical
Psychiatry News, December 1988.
"Addiction to neuroleptics?" American Journal of Psychiatry 146:560, 1989
"Addiction to neuroleptics: Dr. Breggin Replies." American Journal
Psychiatry 146:1240, 1989
"The scapegoating of American children." Rights Tenet, March, 1990.
Reprinted from the Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1989.
"Cingulotomy rightfully abandoned." [letter] The Psychiatric Times , May
1990, p. 8
"The homeless mentally ill." (coauthored by M. Weinberger and P. Breggin)
American Journal of Psychiatry 148:600-601, 1991.
"San Francisco Board of Supervisors passes resolution against shock."
Rights Tenet, Spring 1991.
"More on the California shock controversy." Rights Tenet, Summer 1991.
"The facts about Clozapine (Clozaril)." Rights Tenet, Autumn 1991.
"Feminist paradigms and conflict resolution." (Co-authored by Ginger
Ross-Breggin and Peter Breggin). ICAR Newsletter (Institute for Conflict
Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University) Spring 1992.
"The President's sleeping pill and its makers" (letter). New York Times,
February 11, 1992.
"How and why psychiatry became a death machine [in Nazi Germany]." In
Roland, C., Friedlander, H. and Muller-Hill, B. (Eds.): Medical Science
Without Compassion. Arbeitspapiere-Atti-Proceedings. No. 11. Hamburger
Stiftung fur Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg, May 1992.
"The return of ECT." Readings: A Journal of Reviews and Commentary in Mental
Health, 3 (March, #1), 12-17, 1992.
"Prozac, suicide and violence: An analysis with reports from the Prozac
Survivors Support Group, Inc." Rights Tenet, Winter/Spring 1992.
"The 'Violence Initiative'-- A racist biomedical program for social
control." Rights Tenet, Summer 1992.
"U.S. Government asks, 'Are black people genetically violent?'" (co-authored
by Ginger Breggin). Rights Tenet, Winter/Spring 1992.
"The Federal Violence Initiative: Threats to black children (and others)."
(Coauthored by Ginger Breggin). Psych Discourse (newsjournal of the
Association of Black Psychologists) 24, No. 4 (April):8-11, 1993.
"Psychiatry doesn't cure unhappiness." (letter) New York Time s, September
11, 1993, p. A20.
"The FDA--More harm than good?" Rights Tenet, Summer 1993.
"Psychogate: Eli Lilly buys justice for itself." Rights Tenet , Autumn
1993.
"Children First." Rights Tenet, Winter 1993-94.
"Talking back to Prozac." Psychology Today, July/August 1994, p. 46.
"Prozac story misleading." (letter) APA Monitor (Newspaper of the American
Psychological Association), July 1994, p. 3-4
"Should the use of neuroleptics be severely limited? Yes." In S. A. Kirk
and Susan D. Einbinder P (ed): Controversial Issues in Mental Health .
Boston: Allyan and Bacon, 1994, pp. 146-152.
"Let's not 'treat' the problem of homelessness with drugs." (letter) New
York Times, June 28, 1994, p. A16
"Genetics and crime: Violence and the danger of psychiatric social control."
(Coauthored by Ginger Ross Breggin). 21st Century Afro Review , Fall 1994,
pp. 41-62.
"The Federal Violence Initiative comes to Chicago." Rights Tenet , Spring
1994.
"Talking back to Prozac." Rights Tenet, Summer 1994.
"Joe McCarthy lives!" [About the PR tactics of Eli Lilly] Rights Tenet,
Autumn 1994
"Encephalitis Lethargica." [letter]. Journal of Neuropsychiatry , 7 (3),
p. 387, summer 1995.
"Prozac 'hazardous' to children." (letter) Clinical Psychiatry News,
September 1995, p. 11
"Drugging our children won't cure the problems in schools." Insight
[magazine of the Washington Times] August 14, 1995, p. 18-21.
"Psychiatry doesn't help mental health cause." (letter) New York Times,
March 9, 1995, p. A24
"On the couch, culture affects all." (letter) New York Times , December 8,
1995, p. A30
"Future development of neuroleptic medications: A report to the FDA."
Rights Tenet, Fall 1995
"Campaigns against racist federal programs by the Center for the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology." Journal of African American Men 1:No. 3, 3-22.
Winter 1995/96.
"Prescription privileges." (letter) APA Monitor (newspaper of the American
Psychological Association), March 1996, p. 49.
"The FDA was agitated over Halcion." (letter). Business Week , July 18,
1996.
"Shock treatment III: Resistance in the 1980s." Chapter 4 in Morgan R (Ed):
Electric Shock. Toronto, IPI Publishing, 1985. Republished in Morgan R
(Ed): Electroshock: The Case Against. Morgan Foundation Publishing:
International Published Innovations, Greenville, CA 1997
"Spearheading a transformation." Introduction to P. Breggin & E. M. Stern
(eds): Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Patients . New York:
Haworth Press, 1996.
"Whose attention disorder does Ritalin treat?" (letter). New York Times,
May 20, 1996, p. A14.
"Talking back to Eli Lilly." [Guest Commentary] Sacramento News & Review,
June 13, 1996
"No, don't relax ban" [critique of new FDA rules permitting involuntary
medical experimentation]. (letter). New York Times, November 6, 1996, p.
A6.
Psychotherapy in emotional crises without resort to psychiatric medication."
The Humanistic Psychologist, 25, 2-14, 1998.
"Neuroleptic warning" [in regard to clozapine-induced brain damage in
children]. (letter) Clinical Psychiatry News, March 1998, p. 8.
"Recent FDA decision raises ethical issues in drug research on children."
ICSPP News (International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and
Psychology), Spring/Summer, 1998, p. 3.
"Upcoming government conference on ADHD and Psychostimulants asks wrong
questions." ICSPP News (International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and
Psychology), Spring/Summer, 1998, p. 4.
"Background paper: Details revealed about dangerous federally funded NYC
experiments on children." [No byline] ICSPP News (International Center for
the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology), Spring/Summer, 1998, p. 13.
"Does clozapine treatment cause brain damage?" (1998, September) (letter)
Archives of General Psychiatry 55:845.
"Risks and mechanism of action of stimulants." (1998) In NIH Consensus
Development Conference: Diagnosis and Treatment of Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder: Program and Abstracts, pp. 105-12. Rockville, MD:
National Institutes of Health.
"Interview with Peter R. Breggin, M.D., author of Talking Back to Ritalin."
Corporate Crime Reporter, 12 (16), April 20, 1998.
"Psychostimulant effects on children: A primer for school psychologists and
counselors." (1998, December) Communique' (Newspaper of NASP--National
Association of School Psychologists), pp. 8-9.
"To love them is to drug them?" (February, 1999). Dr. Laura Perspective
[magazine published by Dr. Laura Schlessinger], pp. 8-9, ff.
"Foreword" in Stein, D.B. (1999). Ritalin is not the answer. San Francisco,
Jossey-Bass, pp. ix-xii.
"Foreword" in Vontress, C.E., Johnson, J.A., and Epp, L.R. (1999).
Cross-cultural counseling: A case book. Alexandria, Virginia, American
Counseling Association, pp. xi-xii.
"Prozac pedagogy." (letter). California Lawyer, March 15, 1999, p. 15
"Breaking news that Eric Harris was taking Luvox at the time of the
Littleton Murders." Press Release. International Center for the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology, Bethesda, Maryland, April 30, 1999..
"Treatment of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder." (1999, April 28).
[letter] Vol. 281, No. 16. Journal of the American Medical Association, pp.
1490-1.
"From the editor-in-chief: The need for 'ethical' human sciences and
services." (1999, spring.) Ethical Human Sciences and Services, 1, 3-6.
"NIH consensus report highlights controversy surrounding ADHD diagnosis and
stimulant treatment." (1999, spring). Unsigned news commentary. Ethical
Human Sciences and Services, 1, 9-11.
"National Institute of Mental Health fails in its latest effort to push
Ritalin on America's children." Unsigned report from ICSPP. The Rights
Tenet (Summer 1999), pp. 4-5.
"Your drug may be your problem." Commentary. Washington Times , Sunday,
October 24, 1999, p. B5.
"Don't let 'experts' parent your children." Op Ed Column. USA Today.
Monday, February 28, 2000, p. 19A..
"A critical analysis of the NIMH multimodal treatment study for
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (the MTA study)." Ethical Human
Sciences and Services, 2, 63-72, 2000.
"A dangerous assignment." In Howard Rosenthal (Ed.). Favorite Counseling
and Therapy Homework Assignments: Leading Therapist Shares their Most
Creative Strategies, pp. 58-59. Philadelphia: Brunner Routledge, 2001.
"Neurotoxicants threaten childhood development." (letter). Psychiatric
Times, July 2001, p. 8.
"Confirming the hazards of stimulant drug treatment." (2001) Guest
editorial. International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine , 17,
199-200.
"Psychiatry's reliance on coercion." (2000) Editorial. Ethical Human
Sciences and Services. 2:115-118.
"Empowering social work in the era of biological psychiatry." (2001) The
Ephraim Lisansky lecture of the university of Maryland School of Social
Work. Ethical Human Sciences and Services. 3:197-206.
"MTA study [NIMH clinical trials on stimulants for ADHD] has flaws."
(letter) (2001) Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 1184.
| |
| Mark Probert 2006-06-25, 4:27 pm |
| Joe Parsons wrote:
> On Sun, 25 Jun 2006 00:37:17 GMT, Peter Bowditch <myfirstname@ratbags.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> One has to wonder where there is a reference to "Peter Breggin, a renowned
> researcher in this field." It would have been far more accurate (but less
> telling) to say, "Peter Breggin, discredited professional witness."
That would be, discredited, retired, professional witness.
| |
| Mark Probert 2006-06-25, 4:27 pm |
| Jan Drew wrote:
> "Joe Parsons" <asad@yankeemedia.n3t> wrote in message
> news:rpmr929alacv4i09jt30mqnp1naftjr5gs@4ax.com...
>
> GOD BLESS DR BREGGIN.
From one of Breggin's former colleagues...
(I previously posted several articles about how Breggin was tossed as an
expert witness. However, this says it all.)
VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1 PSYCHNEWS INTERNATIONAL March 1999
-- AN ONLINE PUBLICATION --
_________________________________________________________________
SECTION E: THE FIFTH COLUMN
--------------------------------------------------------
Note: The Fifth Column is a regular PsychNews column,
managed by Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D.
Opinions and comments are invited. Please send them to
the PsychNews Int'l mailbox: psychnews@psychologie.de
--------------------------------------------------------
DOUBLETHINK AT THE ICSPP CORRAL:
A REJOINDER TO PETER R. BREGGIN, M.D.
Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 1999, I posted a short letter on the CSPP listserv
resigning from the Board of Directors for the International Center for
the Study of Psychiatry (ICSPP), Peter R. Breggin, M.D., President, and
Ginger Ross-Breggin, Executive Director. CSPP is a closed, Internet
list with about 100 members, most of whom are either academics or
clinicians in the fields of sociology, psychiatry, psychology, etc.
Some of the members refer to themselves as "psychiatric survivors."
I also requested to be removed from the CSPP listserv.
A few days after I was removed from the list by Ginger Ross-Breggin,
Peter Breggin posted a response to my letter of resignation. I could not
read it since I was no longer on the list.
On January 14, 1999, I requested a member of the CSPP list
post my letter below as a rejoinder to Peter Breggin. The letter was
posted on January 20, 1999. Since the important differences
between people lumped together as "anti-psychiatrists" are clearly
exposed here, I decided to make my letter available publicly.
Not surprisingly, I was subsequently attacked by several
members of the CSPP list. One psychiatrist called my letter a
"drive-by shooting." Others came to my defense. Two letters by
people criticizing me impressed me as exceptional, and I think it is
only fair to include excerpts from them here. One person wrote
the following:
I think it's important that in [the] future we all individually
see to it that no-one attack Peter or Ginger or anyone else on
this list, but especially not Peter or Ginger. . . . .
Why? Because Peter and Ginger are too important to us as
an organization and to us as our treasured leaders and to us
individually as people we care about for us to allow their being
trashed in their own organization. Because they endure too
many attacks outside the organization and they should not
have to deal with them within the organization. Because it can
destroy the organization, by creating so much controversy and
upset that people quit the organization.
The content of any attack is basically irrelevant, in the sense
that it doesn't matter what the person chooses as the content
of the attack, it is still an attempt, whether aware or not, to
gain attention for oneself and/or discredit a leader who has
courageously stepped out there and taken on major leadership.
This is different from an honest difference of opinion. If it is
such, the content of the disagreement will remain respectful
and thoughtful and not go for the jugular, as Schaler's response
to Peter did. The point is for members of this group, when
faced with an attacker, not to debate about whether Peter or
whomever has a failing or not, but to stand up for the person
being attacked and stop the attack. . . .
I say this from experience . . . . As we fight biological
psychiatry more and more, the attacks will get worse, as we
are dealing with some very powerful enemies. It behooves us to
stick together and back our leaders.
And the following letter shows how someone who allegedly
disagrees with the disease model of behavior and institutional psychiatry
still uses diagnosis as a weapon:
As a fairly new member of the Advisory Board, I never met
Dr. Jeffrey Schaler, but I'm amazed at the personal attack and
amount of rage directed by him at Peter. In my 22 years of
practice as a Psychologist, I've rarely seen that kind of anger
and jealous rage in my patients. I accept some of Szaaz's (sic)
viewpoints and reject others.. . . In real life, nothing is as
black or white as Schaler describes. If I were a student of his, I
would be fearful of expressing any opinions that differed from
his or of expressing any ambiguity in my thought process. I
seriously hope that this man can get some help in alleviating
his rage as it will eventually consume him. I'm trully (sic)
embarrased by his inappropriate personal attack on Peter and
on ICSPP. If someone out there knows him well, maybe they
could encourage him to seek help.
For more information about Peter Breggin and ICSPP, including his
view of the Fentress-Lilly liability trial see http://www.breggin.com.
For more information on those sharing Thomas Szasz's views see
http://www.szasz.com.
A REJOINDER TO PETER R. BREGGIN, M.D.
January 14, 1999
Dear Peter,
I'm glad to see you come out of hiding to grace the members
of the listserv with your presence. It took my resignation from
the Board of Directors of International Center for the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology (ICSPP) to do it? And you don't even
send me a copy of what you wrote, when the topic of your missive
is "Regarding Jeff's resignation"? What does that say about
you?
In your letter to ICSPP last week, which Ginger, in her
preview, characterized as "a general statement to the list serve . .
... discussing ICSPP's focus and mission," you wrote:
Jeff for many years has felt that ICSPP should take more
specific viewpoints based on the work of Thomas Szasz. He
has stated that, for example, at our annual meetings. I
myself think that that (sic) Szasz's viewpoint deserves
enormous attention and should be comfortable within ICSPP;
Szasz had a great deal of positive effect on me in my early
professional years, even though I don't agree with him
entirely. But to me that is not the point. How often can
intelligent, thoughtful people agree on everything? How
can they avoid broad areas of serious disagreement? It
seems to me that most intelligent human beings will have
significant and even grave differences of opinion. How, in
this complex world, is it possible for thinking persons not
to find themselves in disagreement about many different
aspects of something as complex as personal responsibility,
for example, or the role of government in our lives? . . .
Even among libertarians, as Jeff identifies himself, there
are very wide differences of opinion on many issues that
Jeff states as absolutes. From my viewpoint, nothing in
Jeff's views makes him incompatible with ICSPP but
ultimately, of course, that is up to Jeff. . .
You are deliberately obscuring the reasons for my
resignation from the Board of Directors of ICSPP. The issue
isn't simply one of disagreement. The issue is one of honesty,
integrity, and courage. You can't have integrity and be
consistently, self-servingly inconsistent, as you are. I voiced
my concern regarding contradictions ever since the first time I
spoke out at the annual meeting you cite. The inconsistency
then concerned your testifying as an expert witness against
anti-depressant pharmaceutical companies. Your testifying,
under oath (!) that Prozac caused a man to commit suicide and
homicide contradicts your position that neurotransmitters don't
cause people to commit suicide and homicide. You said you'd
considered that, but that this was your decision. I said it was
your downfall. It exemplifies your opportunistic dishonesty:
Defense of the "downtrodden mental patient" is so holy a cause
that it justifies lying for it.
You continued:
.. . . I am comfortable with Jeff resigning; it's
consistent with his, and seemingly Szasz's beliefs, that
only one viewpoint is acceptable. Furthermore, this
viewpoint declares down to rather fine details what is
acceptable and what is not. But if Szaszians cannot belong
to ICSPP and have gratifying discussions on this list
serve, where will they? If they cannot have a good
influence in this group, where will they? Even a glance at
the 21 members of the Board of Directors indicates what a
wide diversity of opinion feels comfortable within the
ICSPP community. I certainly hope that those in ICSPP who
substantially share Jeff's views will feel that they belong
as much as anyone else and remain active and vocal.
Meanwhile, ICSPP more and more becomes a network of
people who support each other in taking difficult and even
heroic stands--speaking truth to each other and more
importantly to power. That mutual support should be deeply
gratifying to all of us. Increasing numbers of young
professionals are being inspired to speak and write what
they think because of ICSPP. Older professionals for the
first time in their lives no longer feel isolated. All
this to me, is wonderful. And it is astonishing how open
the debate continues to be and how much respect is shown
for differing viewpoints.
Best regards, Peter Breggin
"It is," as Baltasar Gracian wrote in _The Art of Worldly
Wisdom_ (1647), "a great art to know how to sell wind." My
compliments on your artistry, Peter.
In the 1994 Fentress-Lilly liability suit in Louisville,
Kentucky brought against Eli Lilly of Indianapolis, manufacturer
and distributor of Prozac, by the survivors and relatives to
those killed by Joseph T. Wesbecker on September 14, 1989, you
testified as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. I
would have been interested in testifying against you as an
expert witness for the Defendant. Your testimony is documented
in _The Power to Harm: Mind, Medicine, and Murder on Trial_ by
John Cornwell (1996, Penguin Books, New York). You were taken
to task in court for your self-serving contradictions:
After acknowledging that "we don't know how our
brain relates to thought and to feeling," Breggin
declared that it was generally accepted among
neuroscientists that serotonin "has something to do with
the regulation of impulses . . . either violent impulses
toward others or toward self." . . . [Breggin's]
arguments lacked shape and direction, and he was making
no attempt to explain some of the inherent ambiguities
in his exposition; for example, how low serotonin
activity seems consistent with both criminal behavior
and depression. And he frequently assured the jury that
most of the claims made by the manufacturer were based
on hypotheses rather than hard scientific fact, without
explaining where the dividing line lay between proof and
theory in science.
His argument developed sharper focus, however, when
he described how high levels of hyperactivity provoked
by Prozac were to be found in one out of one hundred
people, according to scientific studies: "In the
extreme, it produces a degree of stimulation which is
psychotic in level, that is, the person loses touch with
reality. They're so overstimulated they may think
they're God or may think they're some incredible
person." (Pp. 180-181)
Joe Freeman, Counsel for the Defendant, objected to your
testimony and told Judge John Potter that you "had been making
contradictory claims about the effects of Prozac -- as being, on
the one hand, scientifically proved, and, on the other, purely
hypothetical." (p. 181)
After three days of questioning, [Paul] Smith
[Plaintiff's counsel] finished with Breggin in the
following fashion:
"Do you have an opinion whether or not Prozac as to
Joseph Wesbecker was unreasonably dangerous?"
"The very fact that Mr. Wesbecker was already
struggling with violent impulses -- see, it's really
important that here he is, he's already struggling with
emotional instability, he has a diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder, he's given a drug that's never
been tested on patients with these problems in its FDA
approval process. It's a drug that would be expected to
.. . . "
"Dr. Breggin, was it unreasonably dangerous for
Joseph Wesbecker?"
"It was unreasonably dangerous, particularly for
Joseph Wesbecker, unreasonably dangerous."
"Did it present an unreasonable degree of harm for
Joseph Wesbecker?"
"For Joseph Wesbecker and those around him it
produced an unreasonable risk of harm."
"Did it produce an unreasonable risk of harm for
the plaintiffs in this case?"
"Yes. Definitely."
"Do you have an opinion concerning whether or not
Prozac was a substantial factor in this tragedy that
occurred at Standard Gravure on September 14, 1989?"
"Definitely, it was a very substantial factor in
what he did." (p. 186-187)
And then, hoisted by your own petard, Freeman delivered the
coup de grace:
"In the same book [_The Psychology of Freedom_], on
the subject of religion, on page seventy, you quote the
difference between believing in the divine . . ."
Smith was at last objecting. The judge called the
attorneys to the bench.
"Let me hear what the quote is going to be," said
Potter.
"The thrust of the quote," said Freeman, "is
there's no difference in believing you're Christ and
believing _in_ Christ, and I think this goes to his
whole credibility on principles and everything else that
he says he espouses."
"This is a religious premise," countered Smith,
"and it is wholly inappropriate to what the man's
religion is."
"This is a psychiatric principle," said Freeman.
"Let me see the book," said Potter, reaching for
it.
After reading for about half a minute, he said: ".
.. . Mr. Smith, he's talking about mental illness."
"Don't let him characterize it as a religious
philosophy, Your Honor."
"It's a quote. Go ahead."
Freeman went ahead. "'The difference between
believing in the divinity of Christ and believing in
oneself as Christ is merely a difference in religious
point of view': did you make that statement?"
Again Breggin was stumbling through an answer that
lasted several minutes: ". . . This is something my
professor, Thomas Szasz, at the university spoke about.
And the point he was trying to make, and that I was
trying to make, is that having a belief is not a
biochemical disorder, so that the person who has gotten
all enrapt (sic) in themselves and thinks they are the
center of the religious universe, that they are like God,
that that person in a sense . . . But at any rate, the
point I was trying to make is that beliefs are not diseases
of the biochemical nature . . . . there's a lot of edge in
that book I'm not comfortable with. I don't hand it
out."
Suddenly Freeman was bellowing in his broad
Georgian accent, marching across the well of the court
toward the witness. "And yet today you have been here
for two days, sir," he yelled, "testifying that Mr.
Joseph Wesbecker for a biochemical reason went out and
did what he did on September the 14th, in the year 1989,
have you not?"
.. . . Having collected his papers and suppressed
his sense of outrage, Freeman launched forth again.
.. . . He asked him, as director of the Center for
the Study of Psychiatry, how many employees he had --
which Breggin was bound to admit was just a single part-
timer. Then he asked how much Breggin was being paid by
the plaintiffs.
Immediately Smith was on his feet, pleading
prejudice. But Potter overruled him, and Breggin had to
admit that he expected to receive $45,000 over a two-
year period.
Changing his tactics one (sic) more, Freeman now
embarked on a review of Wesbecker's entire life from
birth to death. His intention was to ask Breggin,
first, whether he was aware of certain specific factors
in Wesbecker's biography, and, second, whether those
factors were to be found in Dr. [Lee] Coleman's notes.
The purpose of the exercise, which took almost two
hours, was to establish a set of hereditary assumptions
in relation to mental illness in Wesbecker's life, and
to isolate early influences and life crises that might
had led to psychopathic behavior. At the same time,
Freeman wanted to show that few of these factors had
been known to Wesbecker's psychiatrist Dr. Coleman,
since Wesbecker had deliberately concealed them from
him.
Throughout this section of Q and A, Breggin was
increasingly at Freeman's mercy; he could not help
playing into his hands.
"I ask you, sir," Freeman said at one point, "did
you know that Joseph Wesbecker lived with Murrel
Wesbecker at six years of age and that she was dragged
out of the house screaming as they were taking her to
the mental hospital for life as a lunatic? Did you know
that sir?"
"I don't have those details. Don't know if they're
true or false."
"That would not be helpful to a young person in
terms of his environment, would it, sir?"
"I don't know if he witnessed it."
"I will ask you to assume that he was there, there
alone with his grandmother when this happened."
"It would be terrible."
.. . . The purpose was evidently to convince
the jurors once again that Wesbecker's killing spree was
the inevitable result of the circumstances of his whole
life and influences, rather than his medication.
.. . . The crestfallen Breggin seemed uncomfortable
throughout, and it was unlikely that he had retrieved
anything of his enormously damaged prestige.
By the end of his cross-examination, Freeman had
managed to question Breggin for more than two hours
without a single mention of Eli Lilly. (pp. 191-196)
So, Peter, on the one hand you assert for years that Thomas
Szasz was your teacher and that mental illness is a myth and,
when it suits your purpose, you even hide behind his skirt, as
you tried in court in the case against Lilly. You've held, in your
various writings, that behavior is a choice. You have advocated
a "problems-in-living" approach to explaining abnormal behavior.
You base your method of psychotherapy on such explanations. And you
further assert there's no evidence to support the idea that the
brain causes behavior.
On the other hand, you either ignored or did not know of
any environmental factors in Wesbecker's life -- nor did you
apparently even consider them -- , i.e. you eschewed your
"problems-in-living" explanation, and asserted, for $45,000.00,
that Prozac caused Wesbecker to commit homicide and suicide.
You asserted a causal relationship between brain and behavior
was fact -- even while you criticized biologically-based
psychiatrists for confusing theory with fact.
Moreover, on the one hand you use Szasz's argument about
beliefs and socially-acceptable versus socially-unacceptable
delusions, e.g. believing in Christ versus believing one is
Christ. On the other hand you say that Prozac can cause a
person to believe he is God.
While we are at the subject of suicide, suppose a man takes
Prozac and becomes suicidal. Should his suicide be prevented?
How? By involuntary mental hospitalization? If you reject that
option, do you also hold psychiatrists responsible for failing
to prevent suicide, just as you hold the Eli Lilly company
liable for causing suicide?
You remember at the first ICSPP conference last fall when
Joseph Tarantolo said he felt responsible when a patient
suicides. I took the microphone and asked "why should you take
responsibility for your patient's suicide?" And I took the
issue further asking "what's wrong with suicide?" Is suicide
"mental illness?" Do you take responsibility for your clients'
acts of courage? For their acts of discouragement? How can you
ever say you respect your patients' autonomy if you EVER take
ANY responsibility for their behavior -- whatever that behavior
is?
People act and are generally held responsible for their
action. Who should determine when a person is not responsible?
Psychiatrists? Psychologists?
Tom Szasz and Ron Leifer, once your teachers, are now your
conscience. You have a guilty conscience.
Narcissism won't fix a guilty conscience, Peter. The only
way to fix a guilty conscience is by doing the right thing, i.e.
being consistent. Remember how you introduced me at the first
ICSPP conference last year by saying "Jeff is consistent"? Did
you mean I didn't talk out of both sides of my mouth? You knew
then exactly what I am talking about now. You even describe my
resignation above as "consistent." You're consistently
contradicting yourself Peter.
ICSPP is a Breggin lovefest. Everyone knows it and no one
wants to talk about it. The names on the board of directors and
advisors gives the appearance of solidarity -- but solidarity
toward what end? By what means? For Peter Breggin to
contradict himself?
Where is the "study of psychiatry and psychology?" Even
the name of the organization, the "International Center for the
Study of Psychiatry and Psychology," is a lie. Who is studying
psychiatry and psychology? How are they studying it? What have
they found? Where is the evidence to support or not support
what hypotheses? Isn't "the study of psychiatry and psychology"
just a cover for opposing certain drugs and ECT, and helping ex-
mental patients? And you describe ICSPP, in your letter above,
as a "coalition of reform-minded people who share common
concerns but hardly a monolithic viewpoint." Another
contradiction! Coalition means "fusion into one body; union."
You say disagreement is welcome. However, disagreement
doesn't really mean anything in ICSPP when contradictions
prevail. On what basis does one affiliate with ICSPP? What is
the ideology? What is the purpose of the "coalition"
masquerading as a study center? To oppose the therapeutic
state? Or to support the therapeutic state, by endorsing --
indeed demanding -- that it prohibit the use by consenting
adults of "treatments" that you don't like (such as the use
of Haldol and Ritalin)?
Who are the people who make up ICSPP?
People who think drugs are bad? SO? Most people think
drugs are bad. That's why the war on people called the war on
drugs is so popular. You're capitalizing on the war-on-drugs
mentality Peter. Sure, people will come on board. It's the
Pharmakos, Peter. Remember the Pharmakos? Blaming Prozac and
Ritalin for suicide and homicide is the same as supporting the
insanity defense. How can you be against involuntary commitment
and support the insanity defense? That's a contradiction. The
two go hand-in-hand. Are you really against involuntary mental
hospitalization? Have you ever written that you are? Is John
Hinckley not a greater victim of psychiatry than are ex-mental
patients living in freedom at the expense of the taxpayer?
People who think psychotherapy is medicine? SO? Most
people think psychotherapy is medicine. I thought you held that
mental illness does not exist, that it is a myth. Or is it just
ADHD and depression that are myths? Are you saying mental
illness is a myth but psychotherapy is treatment? That's a
contradiction.
People who use self-pity as a weapon? SO? Self-pity is
popular. Psychiatric survivors cherish their "disability."
Here's what Rae Unzicker wrote in a letter that appeared in
TIME, October 31, 1994:
It's about time Peter Breggin, who criticizes the
modern reliance on Prozac and other psychoactive drugs
[MEDICINE, Oct. 10], received the media attention he so
well deserves. I have known Peter for many years as a
colleague and friend in the movement to promote human
rights for psychiatric patients. I have found him not
the least bit "flaky," as your article asserts.
Instead, he and his wife Ginger have opened their home
and their hearts to many psychiatric survivors -- people
like me who have been profoundly wounded by the
psychiatric system that promised and purported to "help"
us, but rather labeled, drugged and brutalized us. (p.
11)
Ms. Unzicker declaims about the "rights" of "psychiatric
patients." Do you believe that individuals have rights as
mental patients or as persons? That "mental patients" have
rights and ought to have rights without corresponding
responsibilities? And if you dare to call attention to their
enthusiasm for denying the reality of mental illness and their
feeling of entitlement for getting paid for being disabled by
mental illness -- well, then, they beat you over the head with
their "suffering" and call you names, a Fascist, a Nazi.
How can you support the idea of "mental disability" and say
that mental illness is a myth? "Mental disability" is a euphemism
for mental illness. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas pulled
the same trick with words when he called mental illness "mental
abnormality" to justify involuntary commitment in _Hendricks
versus Kansas_ last year.
Ginger writes the two of you "appreciate Ted Chabasinski's
comments." Which ones? That "psychiatric survivors" are
somehow more worthy of respect than other people? Are mental
patients "special" in their suffering, like psychiatrists are
"special" in their compassion? What is the meaning of: "There
are many bigots in this world who mask their hatred behind a lot
of jargon and pompous words. As a psychiatric survivor, I got
really tired of Dr. Schaler's attacks on us."? Or of "I joined
CSPP because I know there are at least a few sincere mental
health professionals who are willing to speak out against
abuses, and I have found that to be generally true on this list.
But I'm not comfortable when I find myself and people like
myself attacked by pompous, self-important bigots. So I'm not
going to go along to get along, and I'm not going to join in the
chorus of praise for someone who I think is despicable." That
constitutes 77% of Ted Chabasinski's comments responding to
those members of ICSPP who asked me to reconsider my
resignation. You "appreciate" those comments? What does that
say about the two of you?
Remember identification with the aggressor, Peter? Tom
wrote about it _Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry_. What we're
seeing now is the same old transformation of victim to
victimizer. The Jew becomes the Nazi. The black victimized by
racism becomes the racist full of "entitlements." The
persecuted drug addict becomes the persecutor disguised as a
drug counselor. And you "appreciate" that? Are you running for
public office? Are you pulling a "Peter Kramer," working both
sides of the street?
The fact is you and Peter Kramer are simply two sides of
the same coin. On the one hand we have "Talking to Prozac" and
on the other hand "Listening to Prozac." Both titles are lies!
Prozac cannot listen and we cannot hear what Prozac cannot say.
You give the appearance of advocating existential,
problems-in-living explanations for behavior. Yet, you testify
in court under oath that Prozac caused Wesbecker to commit
homicide and suicide. In other words, you say behavior has
reasons. Then you assert behavior has causes. Peter Kramer
apparently endorses Prozac as a way for people to get in touch
with "the real self." Yet, he also endorses an existential
explanation for abnormal behavior, and an existential approach
to psychotherapy advocated by Hellmuth Kaiser in Louis B.
Fierman's book entitled _The Therapist is the Therapy_ (1997).
To wit:
We still suffer from the universal pathology and still
display the universal symptom. No advances in
psychotherapy, and no amount of biological reductionism,
can obviate the need for individuals to learn to tolerate
their boundedness. No change in the conditions of
treatment removes the therapist's obligation to allow
patients finally to say what they mean. (p. xiii)
In other words, he says behavior is caused. Then he asserts
behavior has reasons. You two are mirror images of one another!
Have you invited him to join ICSPP? If not, why not?
You write "I myself often find myself confused and
uncertain about some of life's more enormous and complicated
issues from personal responsibility to the mind/body problem."
Of course you're confused Peter because you hold contradictory
positions on personal responsibility and the "mind/body
problem."
And now you seem to be embracing "holistic" medicine by
giving James S. Gordon a platform in ICSPP. The body doesn't
cause mind, but the mind can cause the body. That's a
contradiction. Neurotransmitters don't cause behavior; but if
one just thinks the right way, well then, one can get rid of
disease. That's not only a contradiction -- if you truly hold
to the idea that behavior has reasons and things are caused --
it's sadism. As I've mentioned here before, biological
explanations for behavior attempt to remove responsibility where
it belongs. Holistic explanations for disease assign
responsibility where it doesn't belong. They're two sides of
the same coin -- mirror images of one another.
You write you're not sure about the relationship between
the individual and the state. You told me you "used to be a
libertarian." Which are you Peter, a socialist or a capitalist?
When you received $45,000.00 as an expert witness in the
Fentress-Lilly litigation, were you being a capitalist or a
socialist? Did you give the money to "psychiatric survivors"?
If you didn't give it to them, why didn't you? And if you did
give it to them, why did you? Do you believe "mentally
disabled" persons can't or won't work? Do you regard them as
parasites or producers? You can't be both a socialist and a
capitalist without contradicting yourself, Peter. It's one way
or the other.
Are you for liberty and responsibility? If you're for
liberty and responsibility, you can't be "for" ex-mental
patients if they violate the personal or economic rights of
others. If you are libertarian you can't be against drug
companies.
Who are the people who make up ICSPP? People who think
that Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is a legitimate form of
"treatment" for "alcoholism"? SO? AA is very popular. If you
accept that point of view of course people will come on board
ICSPP. The fact AA is a religion masquerading as medicine
sanctioned by the state is apparently acceptable to you. Or
should we not discuss that in ICSPP because AA medicine "worked"
for some members? If state-sanctioned "treatment" for "addiction"
isn't the working of a therapeutic state I don't know what is. Lots
of people are in jail for using and selling drugs. Many more
people will be transferred from jail into "treatment" if Clinton
and Janet Reno get their way, e.g. "drug courts." However,
ICSPP apparently has no interest in this. Why? Because drugs
like heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol are "bad" like Haldol,
Prozac, and Ritalin? That perspective is at least consistent.
You title your journal "Ethical Human Sciences and
Services." Is cognitive therapy "ethical therapy," whereas drug
therapy is not? Should the state pay for "ethical therapy"?
And not pay for "unethical therapy"?
I'd like to hear your answers to the questions I've
raised above. And I'd also like to hear your answers to the
following questions because so many of the ones above are
answered with your answers to the ones below:
1. Do you believe mental illness exists? Can the mind be sick?
2. What is "it" that you treat and/or for which you advocate
"therapy"?
3. Do you consider "love" to be a form of treatment?
4. Do you think that people who harm others and are labeled
"mentally ill" should be held legally accountable for their
actions, and if you do, why don't you speak out in support
of this?
Several people on the ICSPP listserv have kindly sent me
letters requesting that I reconsider my resignation. I
appreciate their suggestion. As I've made clear, I prefer to
stick with my decision. However, I'd like to respond to them
in kind: I ask those of you who agree with the points I've raised
regarding contradictions to reconsider why you are staying in
ICSPP.
Perhaps the following quote from George Orwell in 1984
will help:
Doublethink means the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and
accepting both of them . . . These contradictions are not
accidental, nor do they result from ordinary hypocrisy:
they are deliberate exercises in doublethink. For it is
only by reconciling contradictions that power can be
retained indefinitely . . . If human equality is to be forever
averted -- if the High, as we have called them, are to keep
their places permanently -- then the prevailing mental
condition must be controlled insanity." (Pp. 176-178).
Jeff Schaler
| |
| Jan Drew 2006-06-25, 4:27 pm |
|
"Mark Probert" <markprobert@lumbercartel.com> wrote in message
news:Btxng.84$V27.10@fe09.lga...
> Joe Parsons wrote:
>
> That would be, discredited, retired, professional witness.
Coming from a disbarred despicable attorney. Who likes to try *discredit*
others.
But he didn't even show up to answer the 22 counts of professional
misconduct.
In the Matter of Mark Probert (Admitted as Mark S. Probert), a
Suspended Attorney, Respondent.
Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, Petitioner.
92-02731
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
183 A.D.2d 282; 590 N.Y.S.2d 747
November 9, 1992, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Grievance Committee for the
Tenth Judicial District. Respondent was admitted to the Bar on
February 15, 1978, at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court in the Second Judicial Department, under the name Mark S.
Probert.
DISPOSITION: Ordered that the petitioner's motion to impose discipline
upon the respondent based upon his failure to appear or answer is
granted; and it is further,
HEADNOTES: Attorney and Client - Disciplinary Proceedings
Respondent attorney, who is charged with 22 counts of failing to
cooperate with investigations of alleged misconduct by the Grievance
Committee, and who has failed to answer or appear, is disbarred.
COUNSEL:
Frank A. Finnerty, Jr., Westbury (Muriel L. Gennosa of counsel), for
petitioner.
JUDGES: Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Bracken, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ.,
concur.
Ordered that the petitioner's motion to impose discipline upon the
respondent based upon his failure to appear or answer is granted; and
it is further,
Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately,
the respondent, Mark Probert, is disbarred and his name is stricken
from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent shall continue to comply with this Court's
rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended and resigned
attorneys (22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,
Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary [***2] Law § 90, the respondent,
Mark Probert, is commanded to continue to desist and refrain (1) from
practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or
employee of another, (2) from appearing as an attorney or
counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission
or other public authority, (3) from giving to another an opinion as to
the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4)
from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and
counselor-at-law.
OPINIONBY: Per Curiam.
OPINION: [*282]
[**747] By decision and order of this Court dated September 29,
1989, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law until the
further order of this Court based upon his failure to cooperate with
the Grievance Committee. By further order of this Court dated June 4,
1992, the Grievance Committee was authorized to institute and
prosecute a disciplinary proceeding [*283] against the respondent
and the Honorable Moses M. Weinstein was appointed as Special Referee.
[**748] A notice of petition and petition was personally served upon
the respondent on July 2, 1992. No answer was forthcoming. The
petitioner now moves to hold the [***3] respondent in default. The
motion was personally served upon the respondent on August 14, 1992.
The respondent has failed to submit any papers in response to the
default motion.
The charges involve 22 counts of the respondent's failure to cooperate
with the Grievance Committee in its investigations into complaints of
professional misconduct.
The charges, if established, would require the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction against the respondent. Since the respondent has
chosen not to appear or answer in these proceedings, the charges must
be deemed established. The petitioner's motion to hold the respondent
in default and impose discipline is, therefore, granted. Accordingly,
the respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of
attorneys and counselors-at-law, effective immediately.
Source:
NY UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, ATTORNEY REGIST. UNIT
Currency Status:
ARCHIVE RECORD
NAME & PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION
Name:
MARK PROBERT
Date Of Birth:
11/XX/1946
Gender:
MALE
Address:
1698 WEBSTER AVE
MERRICK, NY 11566
County:
NASSAU
Phone:
516-968-5572
EMPLOYER INFORMATION
Employer:
MARK S PROBERT ESQ
Organization:
PERSON
LICENSING INFORMATION
Licensing Agency:
NY STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
License/Certification Type:
ATTORNEY
License Number:
1253889
Issue Date:
00/00/1978
License Status:
DISBARRED
License State:
NY
| |
| Mark Probert 2006-06-25, 4:27 pm |
| Jan Drew wrote:
> "Mark Probert" <markprobert@lumbercartel.com> wrote in message
> news:Btxng.84$V27.10@fe09.lga...
>
> Coming from a
I posted what a colleague of Breggin said. Sad that you cannot handle
the truth and post H*A*M*A*S.
| |
| Jan Drew 2006-06-25, 9:25 pm |
|
"Mark Probert" <markprobert@lumbercartel.com> wrote in message
news:82Dng.1340$Ym7.424@fe12.lga...
> Jan Drew wrote:
>
> I posted what a colleague of Breggin said. Sad that you cannot handle the
> truth and post H*A*M*A*S.
Coming from a disbarred despicable attorney. Who likes to try *discredit*
others.
But he didn't even show up to answer the 22 counts of professional
misconduct.
In the Matter of Mark Probert (Admitted as Mark S. Probert), a
Suspended Attorney, Respondent.
Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, Petitioner.
92-02731
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
183 A.D.2d 282; 590 N.Y.S.2d 747
November 9, 1992, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Grievance Committee for the
Tenth Judicial District. Respondent was admitted to the Bar on
February 15, 1978, at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court in the Second Judicial Department, under the name Mark S.
Probert.
DISPOSITION: Ordered that the petitioner's motion to impose discipline
upon the respondent based upon his failure to appear or answer is
granted; and it is further,
HEADNOTES: Attorney and Client - Disciplinary Proceedings
Respondent attorney, who is charged with 22 counts of failing to
cooperate with investigations of alleged misconduct by the Grievance
Committee, and who has failed to answer or appear, is disbarred.
COUNSEL:
Frank A. Finnerty, Jr., Westbury (Muriel L. Gennosa of counsel), for
petitioner.
JUDGES: Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Bracken, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ.,
concur.
Ordered that the petitioner's motion to impose discipline upon the
respondent based upon his failure to appear or answer is granted; and
it is further,
Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately,
the respondent, Mark Probert, is disbarred and his name is stricken
from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent shall continue to comply with this Court's
rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended and resigned
attorneys (22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,
Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary [***2] Law § 90, the respondent,
Mark Probert, is commanded to continue to desist and refrain (1) from
practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or
employee of another, (2) from appearing as an attorney or
counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission
or other public authority, (3) from giving to another an opinion as to
the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4)
from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and
counselor-at-law.
OPINIONBY: Per Curiam.
OPINION: [*282]
[**747] By decision and order of this Court dated September 29,
1989, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law until the
further order of this Court based upon his failure to cooperate with
the Grievance Committee. By further order of this Court dated June 4,
1992, the Grievance Committee was authorized to institute and
prosecute a disciplinary proceeding [*283] against the respondent
and the Honorable Moses M. Weinstein was appointed as Special Referee.
[**748] A notice of petition and petition was personally served upon
the respondent on July 2, 1992. No answer was forthcoming. The
petitioner now moves to hold the [***3] respondent in default. The
motion was personally served upon the respondent on August 14, 1992.
The respondent has failed to submit any papers in response to the
default motion.
The charges involve 22 counts of the respondent's failure to cooperate
with the Grievance Committee in its investigations into complaints of
professional misconduct.
The charges, if established, would require the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction against the respondent. Since the respondent has
chosen not to appear or answer in these proceedings, the charges must
be deemed established. The petitioner's motion to hold the respondent
in default and impose discipline is, therefore, granted. Accordingly,
the respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of
attorneys and counselors-at-law, effective immediately.
Source:
NY UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, ATTORNEY REGIST. UNIT
Currency Status:
ARCHIVE RECORD
NAME & PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION
Name:
MARK PROBERT
Date Of Birth:
11/XX/1946
Gender:
MALE
Address:
1698 WEBSTER AVE
MERRICK, NY 11566
County:
NASSAU
Phone:
516-968-5572
EMPLOYER INFORMATION
Employer:
MARK S PROBERT ESQ
Organization:
PERSON
LICENSING INFORMATION
Licensing Agency:
NY STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
License/Certification Type:
ATTORNEY
License Number:
1253889
Issue Date:
00/00/1978
License Status:
DISBARRED
License State:
NY
| |
| Mark Probert 2006-06-26, 4:28 pm |
| Jan Drew wrote:
> "Mark Probert" <markprobert@lumbercartel.com> wrote in message
> news:82Dng.1340$Ym7.424@fe12.lga...
>
> Coming from a
a Jew who you do not like.
(I previously posted several articles about how Breggin was tossed as an
expert witness. However, this says it all.)
VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1 PSYCHNEWS INTERNATIONAL March 1999
-- AN ONLINE PUBLICATION --
_________________________________________________________________
SECTION E: THE FIFTH COLUMN
--------------------------------------------------------
Note: The Fifth Column is a regular PsychNews column,
managed by Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D.
Opinions and comments are invited. Please send them to
the PsychNews Int'l mailbox: psychnews@psychologie.de
--------------------------------------------------------
DOUBLETHINK AT THE ICSPP CORRAL:
A REJOINDER TO PETER R. BREGGIN, M.D.
Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 1999, I posted a short letter on the CSPP listserv
resigning from the Board of Directors for the International Center for
the Study of Psychiatry (ICSPP), Peter R. Breggin, M.D., President, and
Ginger Ross-Breggin, Executive Director. CSPP is a closed, Internet
list with about 100 members, most of whom are either academics or
clinicians in the fields of sociology, psychiatry, psychology, etc.
Some of the members refer to themselves as "psychiatric survivors."
I also requested to be removed from the CSPP listserv.
A few days after I was removed from the list by Ginger Ross-Breggin,
Peter Breggin posted a response to my letter of resignation. I could not
read it since I was no longer on the list.
On January 14, 1999, I requested a member of the CSPP list
post my letter below as a rejoinder to Peter Breggin. The letter was
posted on January 20, 1999. Since the important differences
between people lumped together as "anti-psychiatrists" are clearly
exposed here, I decided to make my letter available publicly.
Not surprisingly, I was subsequently attacked by several
members of the CSPP list. One psychiatrist called my letter a
"drive-by shooting." Others came to my defense. Two letters by
people criticizing me impressed me as exceptional, and I think it is
only fair to include excerpts from them here. One person wrote
the following:
I think it's important that in [the] future we all individually
see to it that no-one attack Peter or Ginger or anyone else on
this list, but especially not Peter or Ginger. . . . .
Why? Because Peter and Ginger are too important to us as
an organization and to us as our treasured leaders and to us
individually as people we care about for us to allow their being
trashed in their own organization. Because they endure too
many attacks outside the organization and they should not
have to deal with them within the organization. Because it can
destroy the organization, by creating so much controversy and
upset that people quit the organization.
The content of any attack is basically irrelevant, in the sense
that it doesn't matter what the person chooses as the content
of the attack, it is still an attempt, whether aware or not, to
gain attention for oneself and/or discredit a leader who has
courageously stepped out there and taken on major leadership.
This is different from an honest difference of opinion. If it is
such, the content of the disagreement will remain respectful
and thoughtful and not go for the jugular, as Schaler's response
to Peter did. The point is for members of this group, when
faced with an attacker, not to debate about whether Peter or
whomever has a failing or not, but to stand up for the person
being attacked and stop the attack. . . .
I say this from experience . . . . As we fight biological
psychiatry more and more, the attacks will get worse, as we
are dealing with some very powerful enemies. It behooves us to
stick together and back our leaders.
And the following letter shows how someone who allegedly
disagrees with the disease model of behavior and institutional psychiatry
still uses diagnosis as a weapon:
As a fairly new member of the Advisory Board, I never met
Dr. Jeffrey Schaler, but I'm amazed at the personal attack and
amount of rage directed by him at Peter. In my 22 years of
practice as a Psychologist, I've rarely seen that kind of anger
and jealous rage in my patients. I accept some of Szaaz's (sic)
viewpoints and reject others.. . . In real life, nothing is as
black or white as Schaler describes. If I were a student of his, I
would be fearful of expressing any opinions that differed from
his or of expressing any ambiguity in my thought process. I
seriously hope that this man can get some help in alleviating
his rage as it will eventually consume him. I'm trully (sic)
embarrased by his inappropriate personal attack on Peter and
on ICSPP. If someone out there knows him well, maybe they
could encourage him to seek help.
For more information about Peter Breggin and ICSPP, including his
view of the Fentress-Lilly liability trial see http://www.breggin.com.
For more information on those sharing Thomas Szasz's views see
http://www.szasz.com.
A REJOINDER TO PETER R. BREGGIN, M.D.
January 14, 1999
Dear Peter,
I'm glad to see you come out of hiding to grace the members
of the listserv with your presence. It took my resignation from
the Board of Directors of International Center for the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology (ICSPP) to do it? And you don't even
send me a copy of what you wrote, when the topic of your missive
is "Regarding Jeff's resignation"? What does that say about
you?
In your letter to ICSPP last week, which Ginger, in her
preview, characterized as "a general statement to the list serve . .
... discussing ICSPP's focus and mission," you wrote:
Jeff for many years has felt that ICSPP should take more
specific viewpoints based on the work of Thomas Szasz. He
has stated that, for example, at our annual meetings. I
myself think that that (sic) Szasz's viewpoint deserves
enormous attention and should be comfortable within ICSPP;
Szasz had a great deal of positive effect on me in my early
professional years, even though I don't agree with him
entirely. But to me that is not the point. How often can
intelligent, thoughtful people agree on everything? How
can they avoid broad areas of serious disagreement? It
seems to me that most intelligent human beings will have
significant and even grave differences of opinion. How, in
this complex world, is it possible for thinking persons not
to find themselves in disagreement about many different
aspects of something as complex as personal responsibility,
for example, or the role of government in our lives? . . .
Even among libertarians, as Jeff identifies himself, there
are very wide differences of opinion on many issues that
Jeff states as absolutes. From my viewpoint, nothing in
Jeff's views makes him incompatible with ICSPP but
ultimately, of course, that is up to Jeff. . .
You are deliberately obscuring the reasons for my
resignation from the Board of Directors of ICSPP. The issue
isn't simply one of disagreement. The issue is one of honesty,
integrity, and courage. You can't have integrity and be
consistently, self-servingly inconsistent, as you are. I voiced
my concern regarding contradictions ever since the first time I
spoke out at the annual meeting you cite. The inconsistency
then concerned your testifying as an expert witness against
anti-depressant pharmaceutical companies. Your testifying,
under oath (!) that Prozac caused a man to commit suicide and
homicide contradicts your position that neurotransmitters don't
cause people to commit suicide and homicide. You said you'd
considered that, but that this was your decision. I said it was
your downfall. It exemplifies your opportunistic dishonesty:
Defense of the "downtrodden mental patient" is so holy a cause
that it justifies lying for it.
You continued:
.. . . I am comfortable with Jeff resigning; it's
consistent with his, and seemingly Szasz's beliefs, that
only one viewpoint is acceptable. Furthermore, this
viewpoint declares down to rather fine details what is
acceptable and what is not. But if Szaszians cannot belong
to ICSPP and have gratifying discussions on this list
serve, where will they? If they cannot have a good
influence in this group, where will they? Even a glance at
the 21 members of the Board of Directors indicates what a
wide diversity of opinion feels comfortable within the
ICSPP community. I certainly hope that those in ICSPP who
substantially share Jeff's views will feel that they belong
as much as anyone else and remain active and vocal.
Meanwhile, ICSPP more and more becomes a network of
people who support each other in taking difficult and even
heroic stands--speaking truth to each other and more
importantly to power. That mutual support should be deeply
gratifying to all of us. Increasing numbers of young
professionals are being inspired to speak and write what
they think because of ICSPP. Older professionals for the
first time in their lives no longer feel isolated. All
this to me, is wonderful. And it is astonishing how open
the debate continues to be and how much respect is shown
for differing viewpoints.
Best regards, Peter Breggin
"It is," as Baltasar Gracian wrote in _The Art of Worldly
Wisdom_ (1647), "a great art to know how to sell wind." My
compliments on your artistry, Peter.
In the 1994 Fentress-Lilly liability suit in Louisville,
Kentucky brought against Eli Lilly of Indianapolis, manufacturer
and distributor of Prozac, by the survivors and relatives to
those killed by Joseph T. Wesbecker on September 14, 1989, you
testified as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. I
would have been interested in testifying against you as an
expert witness for the Defendant. Your testimony is documented
in _The Power to Harm: Mind, Medicine, and Murder on Trial_ by
John Cornwell (1996, Penguin Books, New York). You were taken
to task in court for your self-serving contradictions:
After acknowledging that "we don't know how our
brain relates to thought and to feeling," Breggin
declared that it was generally accepted among
neuroscientists that serotonin "has something to do with
the regulation of impulses . . . either violent impulses
toward others or toward self." . . . [Breggin's]
arguments lacked shape and direction, and he was making
no attempt to explain some of the inherent ambiguities
in his exposition; for example, how low serotonin
activity seems consistent with both criminal behavior
and depression. And he frequently assured the jury that
most of the claims made by the manufacturer were based
on hypotheses rather than hard scientific fact, without
explaining where the dividing line lay between proof and
theory in science.
His argument developed sharper focus, however, when
he described how high levels of hyperactivity provoked
by Prozac were to be found in one out of one hundred
people, according to scientific studies: "In the
extreme, it produces a degree of stimulation which is
psychotic in level, that is, the person loses touch with
reality. They're so overstimulated they may think
they're God or may think they're some incredible
person." (Pp. 180-181)
Joe Freeman, Counsel for the Defendant, objected to your
testimony and told Judge John Potter that you "had been making
contradictory claims about the effects of Prozac -- as being, on
the one hand, scientifically proved, and, on the other, purely
hypothetical." (p. 181)
After three days of questioning, [Paul] Smith
[Plaintiff's counsel] finished with Breggin in the
following fashion:
"Do you have an opinion whether or not Prozac as to
Joseph Wesbecker was unreasonably dangerous?"
"The very fact that Mr. Wesbecker was already
struggling with violent impulses -- see, it's really
important that here he is, he's already struggling with
emotional instability, he has a diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder, he's given a drug that's never
been tested on patients with these problems in its FDA
approval process. It's a drug that would be expected to
.. . . "
"Dr. Breggin, was it unreasonably dangerous for
Joseph Wesbecker?"
"It was unreasonably dangerous, particularly for
Joseph Wesbecker, unreasonably dangerous."
"Did it present an unreasonable degree of harm for
Joseph Wesbecker?"
"For Joseph Wesbecker and those around him it
produced an unreasonable risk of harm."
"Did it produce an unreasonable risk of harm for
the plaintiffs in this case?"
"Yes. Definitely."
"Do you have an opinion concerning whether or not
Prozac was a substantial factor in this tragedy that
occurred at Standard Gravure on September 14, 1989?"
"Definitely, it was a very substantial factor in
what he did." (p. 186-187)
And then, hoisted by your own petard, Freeman delivered the
coup de grace:
"In the same book [_The Psychology of Freedom_], on
the subject of religion, on page seventy, you quote the
difference between believing in the divine . . ."
Smith was at last objecting. The judge called the
attorneys to the bench.
"Let me hear what the quote is going to be," said
Potter.
"The thrust of the quote," said Freeman, "is
there's no difference in believing you're Christ and
believing _in_ Christ, and I think this goes to his
whole credibility on principles and everything else that
he says he espouses."
"This is a religious premise," countered Smith,
"and it is wholly inappropriate to what the man's
religion is."
"This is a psychiatric principle," said Freeman.
"Let me see the book," said Potter, reaching for
it.
After reading for about half a minute, he said: ".
.. . Mr. Smith, he's talking about mental illness."
"Don't let him characterize it as a religious
philosophy, Your Honor."
"It's a quote. Go ahead."
Freeman went ahead. "'The difference between
believing in the divinity of Christ and believing in
oneself as Christ is merely a difference in religious
point of view': did you make that statement?"
Again Breggin was stumbling through an answer that
lasted several minutes: ". . . This is something my
professor, Thomas Szasz, at the university spoke about.
And the point he was trying to make, and that I was
trying to make, is that having a belief is not a
biochemical disorder, so that the person who has gotten
all enrapt (sic) in themselves and thinks they are the
center of the religious universe, that they are like God,
that that person in a sense . . . But at any rate, the
point I was trying to make is that beliefs are not diseases
of the biochemical nature . . . . there's a lot of edge in
that book I'm not comfortable with. I don't hand it
out."
Suddenly Freeman was bellowing in his broad
Georgian accent, marching across the well of the court
toward the witness. "And yet today you have been here
for two days, sir," he yelled, "testifying that Mr.
Joseph Wesbecker for a biochemical reason went out and
did what he did on September the 14th, in the year 1989,
have you not?"
.. . . Having collected his papers and suppressed
his sense of outrage, Freeman launched forth again.
.. . . He asked him, as director of the Center for
the Study of Psychiatry, how many employees he had --
which Breggin was bound to admit was just a single part-
timer. Then he asked how much Breggin was being paid by
the plaintiffs.
Immediately Smith was on his feet, pleading
prejudice. But Potter overruled him, and Breggin had to
admit that he expected to receive $45,000 over a two-
year period.
Changing his tactics one (sic) more, Freeman now
embarked on a review of Wesbecker's entire life from
birth to death. His intention was to ask Breggin,
first, whether he was aware of certain specific factors
in Wesbecker's biography, and, second, whether those
factors were to be found in Dr. [Lee] Coleman's notes.
The purpose of the exercise, which took almost two
hours, was to establish a set of hereditary assumptions
in relation to mental illness in Wesbecker's life, and
to isolate early influences and life crises that might
had led to psychopathic behavior. At the same time,
Freeman wanted to show that few of these factors had
been known to Wesbecker's psychiatrist Dr. Coleman,
since Wesbecker had deliberately concealed them from
him.
Throughout this section of Q and A, Breggin was
increasingly at Freeman's mercy; he could not help
playing into his hands.
"I ask you, sir," Freeman said at one point, "did
you know that Joseph Wesbecker lived with Murrel
Wesbecker at six years of age and that she was dragged
out of the house screaming as they were taking her to
the mental hospital for life as a lunatic? Did you know
that sir?"
"I don't have those details. Don't know if they're
true or false."
"That would not be helpful to a young person in
terms of his environment, would it, sir?"
"I don't know if he witnessed it."
"I will ask you to assume that he was there, there
alone with his grandmother when this happened."
"It would be terrible."
.. . . The purpose was evidently to convince
the jurors once again that Wesbecker's killing spree was
the inevitable result of the circumstances of his whole
life and influences, rather than his medication.
.. . . The crestfallen Breggin seemed uncomfortable
throughout, and it was unlikely that he had retrieved
anything of his enormously damaged prestige.
By the end of his cross-examination, Freeman had
managed to question Breggin for more than two hours
without a single mention of Eli Lilly. (pp. 191-196)
So, Peter, on the one hand you assert for years that Thomas
Szasz was your teacher and that mental illness is a myth and,
when it suits your purpose, you even hide behind his skirt, as
you tried in court in the case against Lilly. You've held, in your
various writings, that behavior is a choice. You have advocated
a "problems-in-living" approach to explaining abnormal behavior.
You base your method of psychotherapy on such explanations. And you
further assert there's no evidence to support the idea that the
brain causes behavior.
On the other hand, you either ignored or did not know of
any environmental factors in Wesbecker's life -- nor did you
apparently even consider them -- , i.e. you eschewed your
"problems-in-living" explanation, and asserted, for $45,000.00,
that Prozac caused Wesbecker to commit homicide and suicide.
You asserted a causal relationship between brain and behavior
was fact -- even while you criticized biologically-based
psychiatrists for confusing theory with fact.
Moreover, on the one hand you use Szasz's argument about
beliefs and socially-acceptable versus socially-unacceptable
delusions, e.g. believing in Christ versus believing one is
Christ. On the other hand you say that Prozac can cause a
person to believe he is God.
While we are at the subject of suicide, suppose a man takes
Prozac and becomes suicidal. Should his suicide be prevented?
How? By involuntary mental hospitalization? If you reject that
option, do you also hold psychiatrists responsible for failing
to prevent suicide, just as you hold the Eli Lilly company
liable for causing suicide?
You remember at the first ICSPP conference last fall when
Joseph Tarantolo said he felt responsible when a patient
suicides. I took the microphone and asked "why should you take
responsibility for your patient's suicide?" And I took the
issue further asking "what's wrong with suicide?" Is suicide
"mental illness?" Do you take responsibility for your clients'
acts of courage? For their acts of discouragement? How can you
ever say you respect your patients' autonomy if you EVER take
ANY responsibility for their behavior -- whatever that behavior
is?
People act and are generally held responsible for their
action. Who should determine when a person is not responsible?
Psychiatrists? Psychologists?
Tom Szasz and Ron Leifer, once your teachers, are now your
conscience. You have a guilty conscience.
Narcissism won't fix a guilty conscience, Peter. The only
way to fix a guilty conscience is by doing the right thing, i.e.
being consistent. Remember how you introduced me at the first
ICSPP conference last year by saying "Jeff is consistent"? Did
you mean I didn't talk out of both sides of my mouth? You knew
then exactly what I am talking about now. You even describe my
resignation above as "consistent." You're consistently
contradicting yourself Peter.
ICSPP is a Breggin lovefest. Everyone knows it and no one
wants to talk about it. The names on the board of directors and
advisors gives the appearance of solidarity -- but solidarity
toward what end? By what means? For Peter Breggin to
contradict himself?
Where is the "study of psychiatry and psychology?" Even
the name of the organization, the "International Center for the
Study of Psychiatry and Psychology," is a lie. Who is studying
psychiatry and psychology? How are they studying it? What have
they found? Where is the evidence to support or not support
what hypotheses? Isn't "the study of psychiatry and psychology"
just a cover for opposing certain drugs and ECT, and helping ex-
mental patients? And you describe ICSPP, in your letter above,
as a "coalition of reform-minded people who share common
concerns but hardly a monolithic viewpoint." Another
contradiction! Coalition means "fusion into one body; union."
You say disagreement is welcome. However, disagreement
doesn't really mean anything in ICSPP when contradictions
prevail. On what basis does one affiliate with ICSPP? What is
the ideology? What is the purpose of the "coalition"
masquerading as a study center? To oppose the therapeutic
state? Or to support the therapeutic state, by endorsing --
indeed demanding -- that it prohibit the use by consenting
adults of "treatments" that you don't like (such as the use
of Haldol and Ritalin)?
Who are the people who make up ICSPP?
People who think drugs are bad? SO? Most people think
drugs are bad. That's why the war on people called the war on
drugs is so popular. You're capitalizing on the war-on-drugs
mentality Peter. Sure, people will come on board. It's the
Pharmakos, Peter. Remember the Pharmakos? Blaming Prozac and
Ritalin for suicide and homicide is the same as supporting the
insanity defense. How can you be against involuntary commitment
and support the insanity defense? That's a contradiction. The
two go hand-in-hand. Are you really against involuntary mental
hospitalization? Have you ever written that you are? Is John
Hinckley not a greater victim of psychiatry than are ex-mental
patients living in freedom at the expense of the taxpayer?
People who think psychotherapy is medicine? SO? Most
people think psychotherapy is medicine. I thought you held that
mental illness does not exist, that it is a myth. Or is it just
ADHD and depression that are myths? Are you saying mental
illness is a myth but psychotherapy is treatment? That's a
contradiction.
People who use self-pity as a weapon? SO? Self-pity is
popular. Psychiatric survivors cherish their "disability."
Here's what Rae Unzicker wrote in a letter that appeared in
TIME, October 31, 1994:
It's about time Peter Breggin, who criticizes the
modern reliance on Prozac and other psychoactive drugs
[MEDICINE, Oct. 10], received the media attention he so
well deserves. I have known Peter for many years as a
colleague and friend in the movement to promote human
rights for psychiatric patients. I have found him not
the least bit "flaky," as your article asserts.
Instead, he and his wife Ginger have opened their home
and their hearts to many psychiatric survivors -- people
like me who have been profoundly wounded by the
psychiatric system that promised and purported to "help"
us, but rather labeled, drugged and brutalized us. (p.
11)
Ms. Unzicker declaims about the "rights" of "psychiatric
patients." Do you believe that individuals have rights as
mental patients or as persons? That "mental patients" have
rights and ought to have rights without corresponding
responsibilities? And if you dare to call attention to their
enthusiasm for denying the reality of mental illness and their
feeling of entitlement for getting paid for being disabled by
mental illness -- well, then, they beat you over the head with
their "suffering" and call you names, a Fascist, a Nazi.
How can you support the idea of "mental disability" and say
that mental illness is a myth? "Mental disability" is a euphemism
for mental illness. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas pulled
the same trick with words when he called mental illness "mental
abnormality" to justify involuntary commitment in _Hendricks
versus Kansas_ last year.
Ginger writes the two of you "appreciate Ted Chabasinski's
comments." Which ones? That "psychiatric survivors" are
somehow more worthy of respect than other people? Are mental
patients "special" in their suffering, like psychiatrists are
"special" in their compassion? What is the meaning of: "There
are many bigots in this world who mask their hatred behind a lot
of jargon and pompous words. As a psychiatric survivor, I got
really tired of Dr. Schaler's attacks on us."? Or of "I joined
CSPP because I know there are at least a few sincere mental
health professionals who are willing to speak out against
abuses, and I have found that to be generally true on this list.
But I'm not comfortable when I find myself and people like
myself attacked by pompous, self-important bigots. So I'm not
going to go along to get along, and I'm not going to join in the
chorus of praise for someone who I think is despicable." That
constitutes 77% of Ted Chabasinski's comments responding to
those members of ICSPP who asked me to reconsider my
resignation. You "appreciate" those comments? What does that
say about the two of you?
Remember identification with the aggressor, Peter? Tom
wrote about it _Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry_. What we're
seeing now is the same old transformation of victim to
victimizer. The Jew becomes the Nazi. The black victimized by
racism becomes the racist full of "entitlements." The
persecuted drug addict becomes the persecutor disguised as a
drug counselor. And you "appreciate" that? Are you running for
public office? Are you pulling a "Peter Kramer," working both
sides of the street?
The fact is you and Peter Kramer are simply two sides of
the same coin. On the one hand we have "Talking to Prozac" and
on the other hand "Listening to Prozac." Both titles are lies!
Prozac cannot listen and we cannot hear what Prozac cannot say.
You give the appearance of advocating existential,
problems-in-living explanations for behavior. Yet, you testify
in court under oath that Prozac caused Wesbecker to commit
homicide and suicide. In other words, you say behavior has
reasons. Then you assert behavior has causes. Peter Kramer
apparently endorses Prozac as a way for people to get in touch
with "the real self." Yet, he also endorses an existential
explanation for abnormal behavior, and an existential approach
to psychotherapy advocated by Hellmuth Kaiser in Louis B.
Fierman's book entitled _The Therapist is the Therapy_ (1997).
To wit:
We still suffer from the universal pathology and still
display the universal symptom. No advances in
psychotherapy, and no amount of biological reductionism,
can obviate the need for individuals to learn to tolerate
their boundedness. No change in the conditions of
treatment removes the therapist's obligation to allow
patients finally to say what they mean. (p. xiii)
In other words, he says behavior is caused. Then he asserts
behavior has reasons. You two are mirror images of one another!
Have you invited him to join ICSPP? If not, why not?
You write "I myself often find myself confused and
uncertain about some of life's more enormous and complicated
issues from personal responsibility to the mind/body problem."
Of course you're confused Peter because you hold contradictory
positions on personal responsibility and the "mind/body
problem."
And now you seem to be embracing "holistic" medicine by
giving James S. Gordon a platform in ICSPP. The body doesn't
cause mind, but the mind can cause the body. That's a
contradiction. Neurotransmitters don't cause behavior; but if
one just thinks the right way, well then, one can get rid of
disease. That's not only a contradiction -- if you truly hold
to the idea that behavior has reasons and things are caused --
it's sadism. As I've mentioned here before, biological
explanations for behavior attempt to remove responsibility where
it belongs. Holistic explanations for disease assign
responsibility where it doesn't belong. They're two sides of
the same coin -- mirror images of one another.
You write you're not sure about the relationship between
the individual and the state. You told me you "used to be a
libertarian." Which are you Peter, a socialist or a capitalist?
When you received $45,000.00 as an expert witness in the
Fentress-Lilly litigation, were you being a capitalist or a
socialist? Did you give the money to "psychiatric survivors"?
If you didn't give it to them, why didn't you? And if you did
give it to them, why did you? Do you believe "mentally
disabled" persons can't or won't work? Do you regard them as
parasites or producers? You can't be both a socialist and a
capitalist without contradicting yourself, Peter. It's one way
or the other.
Are you for liberty and responsibility? If you're for
liberty and responsibility, you can't be "for" ex-mental
patients if they violate the personal or economic rights of
others. If you are libertarian you can't be against drug
companies.
Who are the people who make up ICSPP? People who think
that Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is a legitimate form of
"treatment" for "alcoholism"? SO? AA is very popular. If you
accept that point of view of course people will come on board
ICSPP. The fact AA is a religion masquerading as medicine
sanctioned by the state is apparently acceptable to you. Or
should we not discuss that in ICSPP because AA medicine "worked"
for some members? If state-sanctioned "treatment" for "addiction"
isn't the working of a therapeutic state I don't know what is. Lots
of people are in jail for using and selling drugs. Many more
people will be transferred from jail into "treatment" if Clinton
and Janet Reno get their way, e.g. "drug courts." However,
ICSPP apparently has no interest in this. Why? Because drugs
like heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol are "bad" like Haldol,
Prozac, and Ritalin? That perspective is at least consistent.
You title your journal "Ethical Human Sciences and
Services." Is cognitive therapy "ethical therapy," whereas drug
therapy is not? Should the state pay for "ethical therapy"?
And not pay for "unethical therapy"?
I'd like to hear your answers to the questions I've
raised above. And I'd also like to hear your answers to the
following questions because so many of the ones above are
answered with your answers to the ones below:
1. Do you believe mental illness exists? Can the mind be sick?
2. What is "it" that you treat and/or for which you advocate
"therapy"?
3. Do you consider "love" to be a form of treatment?
4. Do you think that people who harm others and are labeled
"mentally ill" should be held legally accountable for their
actions, and if you do, why don't you speak out in support
of this?
Several people on the ICSPP listserv have kindly sent me
letters requesting that I reconsider my resignation. I
appreciate their suggestion. As I've made clear, I prefer to
stick with my decision. However, I'd like to respond to them
in kind: I ask those of you who agree with the points I've raised
regarding contradictions to reconsider why you are staying in
ICSPP.
Perhaps the following quote from George Orwell in 1984
will help:
Doublethink means the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and
accepting both of them . . . These contradictions are not
accidental, nor do they result from ordinary hypocrisy:
they are deliberate exercises in doublethink. For it is
only by reconciling contradictions that power can be
retained indefinitely . . . If human equality is to be forever
averted -- if the High, as we have called them, are to keep
their places permanently -- then the prevailing mental
condition must be controlled insanity." (Pp. 176-178).
Jeff Schaler
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