Politics and Medicine - CT DCF Criminals Update, Jan 1, 2006

Author

CT DCF Criminals Update, Jan 1, 2006

kathleen

2006-01-01, 11:01 am

http://actionlyme.org
http://www.freespeech.com/index.php...b4eef590e1cc1a=
e59953a71/
http://actionlyme.org/CRIMINAL_DCF_GAUVIN.htm
http://www.mail-archive.com/kids_co...u/msg00216.html
("an appalling combination of arrogance and ineptitude")
http://actionlyme.org/DCF_TOO_STUPID.htm
http://actionlyme.org/tryintatawktuum.htm
http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/press4.html DCF beating the boys
http://actionlyme.org/DCF_ABUSE_UPDATE_NOV_30_2005.htm
http://www.cslib.org/attygenl/press...tmentvideos.htm
DCF beating the boys... still
http://www.ctkidslink.org/pub_detail_203.html DCF defrauding the feds
(again)
http://starkravingviking.blogspot.c...c-of-abuse.html
DCF Supervisor Tampering with a witness, Fabricating Evidence
http://actionlyme.org/DCF_WORKER_BR...S_TO_SCHOOL.htm
(*another* one)
http://www.walrradio.com/inkel.htm DCF's criminal behavior and abuse
of the Inkel family

"We expect that when the state removes a child they assume
responsibility for the care of that child, that they would do a better
job than her 10-year-old sister," said state Child Advocate Jeanne
Milstein.
http://actionlyme.org/STUPID_DCF_UPDATE_30_DEC_05.htm

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

Milstein [The Child Advocate] sues DCF over agency's treatment of
abused child,

Associated Press, December 18 2003

"Milstein accused DCF of "callous and reckless indifference" in
caring for the youth, and she suspects other children might be
suffering because of the agency's missteps.

DCF's "actions and omissions were so egregious as to violate this
young man's constitutional and statutory rights," Milstein said
Wednesday. "It is now my office's moral, ethical and legal
responsibility to pursue legal remedy for this boy."

"Tragically, this case is not isolated," Milstein said. "There are
over 6,000 Connecticut children in out-of-home care. I am gravely
concerned that many other children are suffering the same *** callous
and reckless indifference*** to their safety and rights that DCF has
shown Boy Doe. I am convinced that the department lacks the essential
understanding of the effects of trauma on children."
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
http://www.ctnow.com/news/local/nor...ec21,1,3228925=
..story?coll=3Dhc-big-headlines-breaking

COVER STORY

How Do You Like Me Now?
By DAN HAAR, December 21 2003

"COURANT: Shortly after Enron, you talked about management at the
state ***** Department of Children and Families *****, you talked about
no-bid contracts, you talked about pay for play and you talked about
Rowland's general management of his office. All four of those things
which we now, in the light of the investigations and in light of the
plea of [former Deputy Chief of Staff] Larry Alibozek, we now think of
as being related. They were not then thought of as being related. Why
not?

CURRY

Long pause) First of all, some people thought they were
related. Rowland's numbers, the public began to get a sense of who
Rowland was. It's hard to plow through all the facts.

Weeks before that election, investigative work that I and my staff did
documented the bid-rigging and the overcharges by the governor's
favorite donors for which Mr. Ellef and Mr. [William] Tomasso now face
almost certain indictment, for which Mr. Alibozek has already pleaded
guilty. We had all the projects, all the bids, all the overcharges.

That was your press conference on Sept. 24.

Yeah. The governor's closest staff, in all likelihood, will be marched
en masse off to prison. And after we had disclosed all of this, not a
single newspaper wrote an editorial criticizing it. And in your own
paper it appeared, I believe, in the front page of the second section.

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

courant.com
http://www.courant.com/news/local/n...n01,0,5878005.=
story

Death Brings Changes But No Guarantees
By RINKER BUCK

January 1 2006

The state Department of Children and Families took immediate remedial
steps to improve conditions at the Trumbull facility for medically
fragile children where 2-year-old Leeana Candelario died in April - the
victim of apparent incompetent care and neglect.

But DCF can't guarantee that tragedies such as Leeana's death won't
happen again. Although the state officials said they have confidence in
the group home, they conceded that staffers there made a number of bad
decisions.

That was part of the message delivered by DCF Commissioner Darlene
Dunbar and two aides during an hour-long question-and-answer session
with NE staff members last week. The meeting followed a Dec. 18 story
in the magazine by Kevin Rennie examining what went wrong in the care
of Leeana as detailed in a 40-page confidential report by DCF's Special
Investigations Unit.

The child, who had a tracheostomy, died of respiratory failure - a
result of the staff's failure to properly clear her breathing tube and
their inability to handle the ensuing emergency.

DCF's Response To The Death

Accompanied by Lou Ando, chief of DCF's Behavioral Health Unit, and DCF
spokesman Gary Kleeblatt, Dunbar answered questions from Rennie,
reporter Colin Poitras and NE editor Jenifer Frank. The commissioner
described how the agency instituted a "corrective action plan" at
Trumbull House, an affiliate of St. Vincent's Medical Center in
Bridgeport, after Leeana's death there. Similar actions were taken at a
sister facility in Stratford.

"What happens when you have such a tragic outcome and occurrence of
death of a child is we immediately stop admissions, and we use that
period of time with any provider to assess," the commissioner said. "Do
we think, first of all, that the children who are still in that
facility are safe? And that's what we immediately determined. ...Then
we look at the over-arching issues of what else here potentially needs
to be corrected, or at least assessed for what else should be
corrected."

Ando described the corrective plan.

Ando: "When we first went in to look at their program, there were
issues around documentation of training. We wanted to be sure that
staff were trained. At a program like St. Vincent's, the needs of each
child were unique, and so there needed to be a lot of individual,
child-specific training. So our first issue was to be sure that the
people who were there knew how to deal with the kids who were there. To
not further complicate that, we didn't allow any further admissions
until we were sure that it was safe for those kids, that the staff
there knew how to deal with them.

"And so the corrective action plan that was developed - actually it was
developed by them and we approved it - consisted of a training plan, a
training program, being sure it was documented appropriately and staff
were appropriately trained, and secondly the addition of licensed
personnel to oversee those kinds of functions."

Rennie: "Do you mean more supervisors?

Ando: "I mean a pediatrician, I mean an APRN [advance practice
registered nurse], a couple of RNs [registered nurses], house
supervisors, that kind of stuff."

Dunbar: "In the Trumbull location, the staffing almost doubled and the
[compensation] rate was reassessed to support that and also the
increased administrative presence."

Trust In Staff Qualifications

Rennie and Frank questioned Dunbar about the adequacy of the licensing
process for such facilities.

Rennie: "St. Vincent's had been open several years. Why weren't any of
these things done before Leanna died?"

Dunbar: "From a contracting seat, the facility was fully licensed. And
with the licensure met, we then rely on - in this case particularly - a
medical facility, a medical-based model to really honor the
requirements of what would be required for best care."

Rennie: "But something terrible went wrong, and the report indicates
that someone could have easily detected that if they'd been paying
attention to St. Vincent's. There was frequent turnover, inexperienced
personnel, people who had really never worked with children, a lot of
workers who had been in geriatrics. Why did it take until Leeana
Candelario died to somehow have this sort of review conducted?"

Dunbar: "We do trust that - especially in this case, which was a
medical model - that a registered nurse would know the requirements of
what that licensure required and what that job is - that a licensed
practical nurse would be able to meet those same standards. So we do,
as a state, rely on the facility providing what that care is supposed
to be. In this case, you are exactly right. With this experience and
this example, this was a failure. And this was a failure to assure that
that best practice was there."

Rennie: "Were there any alarms raised during the licensure period,
since that was going on at the same time?"

Dunbar: "I don't believe so. No, there weren't."

Frank: "And St. Vincent's was licensed by whom?"

Ando: "By DCF. Our quarterly license review was done in January. We
were due for another review in early May."

Afraid To Question Care

The Special Investigations Unit report also described how one nurse who
complained about the lack of qualifications of her supervisor was told
that she could quit her job if she couldn't get along with her boss.
This and other examples suggested to Rennie that a culture of fear
surrounded the group home. Its employees worried about retribution if
they complained to higher management about poor medical practices.

Rennie: "What have you done to address the issue of fear of retribution
among employees? ... Throughout [the report], the employees were
saying, `I knew we were in over our heads, I was afraid to say
anything.' Your [work] shifts would be split [if they complained].

"They refer to a loving atmosphere at Trumbull House. There was nothing
loving going there on among the employees ..."

Dunbar: "Well, I think when you raise the level of expertise of the
folks that you are working with, and you try to really start taking
more of a leadership role as well, and you have a greater
administrative presence so you're all starting to know more about
what's occurring on a day-to-day basis - I think all of that
tremendously helps. I think the increased training and the increased
focus on their development, and on listening to what they say are
concerns, and what they say needs to be corrected - I think that's
making a difference there."

Rennie: "Do you tell employees that there are ways for them to alert
the department to problems without their names being disclosed?"

Dunbar: "I would assume they know, but we have certainly made sure that
employees knew about being able to call the hot line, through being
anonymous. You can still request anonymity. So I think staff are aware
that they don't have to say their name. I think just generally there is
some - I think fear is too strong, but some wondering about that as far
as not leaving their name - because usually when people say the
information, you know it's from someone in the facility."

Rennie: "Someone called right after [Leeana] had died."

Dunbar: "And what that says to me is that people are taking that a
little more seriously and are able to speak up ... I know that's what
we're interested in having there. And I know that's what the leadership
at St. Vincent's is committed to sharing. But absolutely, we absolutely
need that and demand that, because the only way to assure that children
are safe anywhere is really that everybody recognizes that they're a
piece of that and that we have ways, like the request for anonymity, to
be able to bring issues to the forefront."

Ando: "If I can add two things: First of all, one of the changes we
initiated which we hoped to address ... fear of retribution is always
difficult to address, difficult to get your arms around.

Rennie: "It's not difficult if you say to the people running the place,
`If you dare do anything to these workers who are telling us the truth,
we'll cut off your contract.'"

Ando: "What we asked for was that a house manager be put in charge of
each of these facilities, which hadn't been the case prior. ... Our
expectation was that the primary role of these house managers would be
to find things that needed improvement ... We told them we were not
looking at a punishment-oriented perspective but were looking at a
quality-improvement perspective. We wanted them to identify deficits
that we could tackle. We don't expect there's going to be retribution
for those reports."

No Guarantees Against Tragedy

St. Vincent's was supposed to have been a temporary placement for
Leeana. Her medical needs were not severe enough to require long-term
hospitalization, but the state could not immediately organize
professional home care for her either, although this might have
eventually been the goal. So she was placed at a facility that was
"appropriate," Dunbar said, but not intended as a long-term solution.

"Certainly there was not a range of options to be able to meet this
individual little girl's needs," Dunbar said. "We have around 250
children that need this kind of level of support in their homes, in
foster homes and other places. This is a struggle, because the other
piece that this story shows so much about - and DCF has no better way
to solve this than the rest of the state or the rest of the country -
is basically a question of nursing, the availability of nurses, the
availability of the appropriately trained nursing for every level of
care you need at the times you need them.

"If you're looking to have such a highly complex amount of nursing in a
family home," the commissioner said, "can you really get that nursing
for all the hours you need it, and can you get it where you are? And
that certainly showed up in this case."

But the problems go well beyond the national shortage of nurses. The
sheer number of children with special medical needs makes it difficult
for any state agency to guarantee that another tragedy like Leeana's
won't happen.

"In any facility, in any place actually, there is always the chance for
a tragedy to occur, "Dunbar said. "We deal with that. Our work is
human-based. So you start from that premise. The goal is that it's zero
[errors], absolutely, but we do know ... a state system that operates
with people as its operational core is not able to guarantee 100
percent safety in any placement. Accidents happen.

"So I would start with the premise that individual children are being
cared for appropriately at St. Vincent's. There was a tragedy,
absolutely - there is a lot of feeling associated with that on
everyone's part - but there are individual children there at St.
Vincent's today who we believe are being appropriately cared for. ...
For us, we have to assure that with this death, we have some ownership
about how we make sure the system changes, gets better and keeps
strengthening that work."

Rinker Buck is an NE staff writer.

Copyright 2006, Hartford Courant

kathleen wrote:
> http://actionlyme.org/TUCKER_BLUMEN...L_27_OCT_05.htm
>
>
> 27 Oct 2005
>
>
>
> AAG John Tucker
>
> 860-808-5590
>
> 55 Elm, Hartford, 06106 VALIDATION
> OF YALE'S LYME TEST
>
>
>
>
>
> Dear Mr. Tucker-
>
>
>
>
>
> Please take this to your staff patent attorneys to confirm.
>
>
>
> Verify independently that this is the text of the Yale patent US # 5,
> 618, 533
>
>
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
> This means they have the ability to diagnose Lyme (borreliosis)
> accurately and early but they chose not to because they chose to make
> more money on a bogus vaccine instead.
>
>
>
> The "CLAIM" of the patent, if you look at it, is a fragment of DNA
> code, which means no one can use this unless licensed by Yale- which
> means they have a monopoly on testing and they prefer we don't have it
> available to us.
>
>
>
> Yale's own validation is written within the claim of this patent 5,
> 618,533 and is well-described.
>
>
>
>
>
> UCONN's Henry Feder tested the OspA vaccine on children in Europe
> when he knew that would do them no good and in fact, was harmful. This
> vaccine never should have gone to human trials.
>
>
>
> Yale has an early and accurate test for Lyme, but did not use it, when
> all agree that early treatment gives better patient results.
>
>
>
> This is CT's disease.
>
>
>
> We have children in CT.
>
>
>
> Lyme borreliae can infect the brain and does in 2/3 of the cases
> (Dattwyler published data).
>
>
>
> It kind of makes sense to detect Lyme as early as possible to prevent
> this infection from reaching the brain and causing brain damage to
> children.
>
>
>
> The State's resistance to this concept is unforgivably incompetent,
> abusive, and technically is child abuse and medical neglect.
>
>
>
> - - -
>
> The Yale Flagellin Patent Validation is right in the text of the
> patent:
>
>
>
> http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-...ct2=3DHITOFF&d=
=3DPALL&p=3D1&u=3D/
>
> netahtml/srchnum.htm&r=3D1&f=3DG&l=3D50&s1=3D5618533.WKU.&OS=3DPN/5618533=
&RS=3DPN/5618533[vbcol=seagreen]
>
>
>
>
>
> "The sera we used for these studies were obtained from Lyme disease
> patients, most of whom were seen at the Lyme disease clinic of the
> Department of Rheumatology, Yale university School of Medicine. All
> patients tested serologically positive on a standard ELISA test using
> whole sonicated B. burgdorferi as antigen. In FIG. 3, patients 5, 8, 16
> and 17 had ECM. Patients 2, 4-8, and 10-11 had chronic arthritis of
> greater than 6 months duration, patient 14 had peripheral neuritis,
> patient 16 had Bell's Palsey, patient 17 had severe headache and
> patient 18 had encephalopathy. Patients 1, 3, 9, 12-13 and 15 had
> arthritis.
>
>
>
> As can be seen from FIG. 3, a homogeneous response was observed for
> most patient sera. Overlapping fragments A and B and fragment D define
> regions of generally low reactivity. In contrast, seventeen of 18
> patient's sera react strongly to the overlapping fragments E, F, and G.
> Fragments F and G are bound to
>
> approximately the same extent in all patients, and fragment H is much
> more weakly bound.
>
>
>
> Sera from two healthy individuals (which also tested negative for B.
> burgdorferi infection in an ELISA) failed to react with any of the
> fragments. Moreover, we screened 10 additional control sera for 41 kDA
> and fragment E reactivity and all were negative (data not shown.).
>
>
>
> Fragments E, F, and G define a region (amino acids 197-241) that is
> highly reactive with anti-B. burgdorferi antibodies in patient sera,
> but which does not share significant sequence homology to the
> flagellins of Escherichia coli, Salmonella typhimurium, Salmonella
> rubislaw, Roseburia cecicola or Serratia marcescens (except for four of
> seven identical amino acids within a short stretch defined by amino
> acids 209 to 215). Similarly, this region contains only a short segment
> of homology (four of 6 amino acids identical between amino acids
> 211-216) with the flagellin protein sequence of Treponema pallidum [C.
> I. Champion et al., "Cloning, Sequencing, And Expression Of Two Class B
> Endoflagellar Genes Of Treponema pallidum subsp. pallidum Encoding The
> 34.5 And 31.0-Kilodalton Proteins", Infect. Immun., 58, pp. 1697-1704
> (1990)]. Accordingly, fragments E, F and G should not show substantial
> reactivity with antibodies directed against other bacteria or
> treponemes, and thus should represent immunodominant regions that are
> useful in the flagellin polypeptides of this invention.
>
>
>
> To confirm these findings, we performed an immunoblot of fragments A-K
> using sera from 11 patients with Treponema pallidum, the agent of
> syphilis. The serum samples were obtained from the Connecticut State
> Laboratory. All the sera had VDRL titers ranging from 1:4 to 1:128 and
> all were positive by specific
>
> fluorescent antibody assay (FTA). We chose syphilitic sera because B.
> burgdorferi is closely related to Treponema pallidum and syphilis is
> the most common spirochetal infection of humans in the United States.
>
>
>
> While 10 of the 11 sera bound fragment 41-B, which contains 65 NH.sub.2
> -terminal amino acids of flagellin and thus represents a conservative
> figure for the level of binding one would expect to see for the
> full-length flagellin antigen, only two of the sera demonstrated
> detectable binding to fragment 41G, and that binding was very weak.
> After prolonged exposure, weak binding to the other fragments was
> detected.
>
>
>
> We also tested the diagnostic effectiveness of the flagellin
> polypeptides of this invention by ELISA. We coated microtitration
> plates with 200 microliters per well of recombinant 41-G fusion protein
> (1 microgram/ml) suspended in 0.05M sodium carbonate, pH 9.6. We also
> used whole, sonicated B. burgdorferi strain
>
> 297 as a coating antigen as previously described [J. R. Craft et al.,
> "Antibody Response In Lyme Disease: Evaluation Of Diagnostic Tests", J.
> Inf. Dis., 149, pp. 789-95 (1984)]. We incubated the plates at
> 4.degree. C. overnight, then washed with PBS containing 0.05% Tween-20
> (PBST). The patient sera we used were
>
> diluted 1:100 in PBST and applied in triplicate to each antigen-coated
> plate at 200 micrograms per well. Plates were then incubated at room
> temperature for 75 minutes. We then washed the plates three times with
> PBST. For detection of bound antibody, goat anti-human mu chain
> alkaline phosphatase conjugate (Sigma) was diluted 1:1000 in PBST and
> applied at 200 microliters per well to the appropriate plates. We then
> incubated the plates at room temperature for 45 minutes. After three
> washes in PBST, p-nitrophenyl phosphate was added to each
>
> well. The production of p-nitrophenyl was monitored at 405 nm and the
> reaction stopped with 3M NaOH when the appropriate positive control
> wells reached an optical density (A405 value) of 1.0 to 1.5. We
> calculated the numerical values of the antibody response of patients'
> sera to each antigen by comparison to standard curves established on
> each antigen using known positive Lyme disease sera as previously
> described (J. R. Craft et al. supra).
>
>
>
> Briefly, we established standard curves, using serial 2-fold dilutions
> of known IgM and IgG positive Lyme disease sera, for each antigen, with
> patients' sera applied to the same plates. In addition, eight known
> normal sera were run on the same plate, each at a 1:100 dilution; the
> mean A405 value of these eight sera was set as the cut-off A405 value.
> The first serial dilution of the standard positive sample that exceeded
> this cut-off value was assigned a value of 100 antibody units, and a
> curve relating A405 value to antibody units was established on this
> basis. The average A405 value for each patient serum was then compared
> to the standard curve and a value of antibody units was assigned to
> each serum on the basis of this comparison. A negative titer was <100
> units,
>
> and titers of 200 to 400 represent reactivity compared to control,
> positive serum at subsequent 2-fold dilutions. We tested some of the
> serum samples a minimum of 2 times on separate occasions and in each
> instance there was never more than a 2-fold difference in the measured
> antibody levels.
>
>
>
> Of the eleven syphilitic serum samples, three (having VDRL titers of
> 1:8, 1:32 and 1:128) showed weak reactivity with B. burgdorferi, yet
> none showed reactivity with the 41-G fragment.
>
>
>
> Thus, a flagellin polypeptide comprising an immunodominant region
> corresponding to fragment 41G is highly specific and highly sensitive
> as well.
>
>
>
> In other ELISAs to detect the presence of anti-B. burgdorferi
> antibodies, we found a high correlation in test results using whole
> spirochete extract or 41-G as the substrate. However, in a small number
> of patients, some discrepancies in results yielded by various
> substrates were noted. Over half of the "discrepant" results occurred
> with values just above the positive cut-off. Accordingly, as with any
> diagnostic assay, the sensitivity of diagnostic assays utilizing the
> flagellin polypeptides of this invention should be rigorously
> standardized...."
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> What that means is that there is no arguing the validity of my claim
> that Yale committed a crime. This is their own patent claim and
> validation.
>
>
>
> You should be investigating and prosecuting this and not me. LymeRIX
> was scientific fraud. I have already given several of the State's
> Attorneys this data. I gave AAG Tom Ryan the Dearborn booklet and the
> old CDC published standard in the summer of 2003. I have been in
> communication with you before. I believe it was over my complaint
> against the State to the CT Commission on Human Rights in Waterbury.
>
>
>
> False Claims Act =E0 Allen Steere's 1993 blood testing standard for
> Lyme. All the US grants that were paid out upon that bogus standard,
> such as Klempner's chronic Lyme "study" were also false claims.
> The validity of the Yale Lyme vaccine qualification was a false claim,
> and they obviously knew it, since this is their earlier VALID
> diagnostic test.
>
>
>
> http://whistleblowerlaws.com/protection.htm
>
>
>
> I give the State the data, the State is not supposed to harass and
> abuse us, in response. The potential claims against Yale are huge.
> Yale cannot say the above is not a validation: It is Accurate,
> Specific, Early and tested empirically in the field.
>
>
>
>
>
> KMDickson
>
> http://actionlyme.org
>
>
>
> CC: Gonzales, Chertoff, Goss, Mueller, Rendell, Sheller, Blumenthal,
> Milstein, McGuigan, Spitzer, Droney, Dorsey, Chatigny, Torres,
> Fitzgerald
>
>
> kathleen wrote:
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