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October 17, 2004
LONG ISLAND
Island Fever
By MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER CARROLL
ellmore — This summer, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center off the
east end of Long Island suffered two outbreaks of the foot-and-mouth
virus, one of many microbes researched and stored there. Despite
letters from federal, county and town officials, researchers from the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Agriculture
failed to disclose the outbreaks, which took place in June and July,
until nearly a month after the second occurrence. The public learned
of them only after an anonymous tip reached the ears of a reporter.
While the virus can cause illness in humans, it is not fatal. But
these latest accidents raise the specter of a future outbreak of other
germs with lethal consequences. They also represent another instance
in a long history of failed and belated disclosures at Plum Island.
Unless changes are made, the government should close the lab.
Plum Island has a long and checkered history. It began as the
brainchild of a German biological warfare scientist, Erich Traub, who
was secretly smuggled into the United States in 1949 to perform
biological weapons research for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Army and the Navy. The laboratory was established in 1954 by the Army
to research exotic germs for use against enemy food supplies.
In the mid-1950's, the Army turned over control of Plum Island to the
Department of Agriculture, which in turn relinquished much of it to
the Department of Homeland Security last year. A number of the germs
researched on Plum Island are dangerous to humans and animals and some
are lethal, including the mosquito-borne Rift Valley fever virus,
which causes hemorrhagic fever akin to the Ebola virus and killed 600
people in Egypt in 1977 and 1978.
During the 1980's and early 1990's, Plum Island was charged with more
than 260 violations of workplace safety law violations by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, including improper
disposal of virus syringes and radioactive cobalt-60, unlabeled and
mislabeled hazardous chemical containers and workers bitten and
trampled by test animals. In addition, according to the Environmental
Protection Agency, from the mid-1990's to 2002 there were violations
of state and federal environmental laws, including illegal animal
sewage discharges into local waters under the Clean Water Act. The New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation described the
environmental pollution as troubling, and in December 2002, the island
made the National Resources Defense Council's "Dirty Dozen" list of
the 12 worst polluters in New York and New Jersey.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, a file with information on Plum Island was
found by American forces in Afghanistan in the Kabul residence of
Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former nuclear scientist from Pakistan
whom American officials have identified as an associate of Osama bin
Laden. Last year, the Government Accountability Office, the
investigative arm of Congress, found that laboratory officials "have
not adequately controlled access to the pathogens."
Ostensibly in response to this and concerns raised by elected
officials, in July Plum Island bolstered the small 24-hour detail
provided by a private security firm with part-time federally trained
armed guards. Plum Island administrators claim that the laboratories
are as safe "as a federal courthouse." They stress that the scientists
work only on animal pathogens, particularly diseases that affect farm
animals. They say that Plum Island is well protected, and that they
meticulously detail biological safety and security practices to
reporters with whom they've pledged to be forthright about problems
that arise. They boast on their Web site that they are "proud" of
their safety record.
But the foot-and-mouth outbreaks that occurred this summer raise
important questions: How did it happen? Were proper safety measures
followed? What is being done to prevent it from happening again?
To address some of these problems, several security measures should be
taken. First, armed couriers should be employed to transport the
foreign germs that arrive at nearby international airports and are
carried along Connecticut and New York roads. Moreover, emergency
first responders like county fire and police officials should be
notified of each trip and be properly equipped and prepared to respond
to a biological accident or terrorist attack. Second, the Department
of Homeland Security must enforce a no-flight zone over Plum Island.
And third, the department must re-establish full federal control of
the island. Plum Island's biological containment, security, sewage and
water systems are now run by a private contractor, but the work being
done there is too dangerous to be in private hands.
By contrast, Plum Island's sister laboratory in Ames, Iowa, holds less
dangerous germs and it is not privatized. In fact, in 2003, Senator
Tom Harkin of Iowa blocked an effort to install private contractors
there. The Ames laboratory, he said, is "a vital function of the
federal government, and it should remain the responsibility of federal
employees." New York's elected officials should follow Mr. Harkin's
lead.
Until these steps are taken, Plum Island will remain a threat to its
neighbors and a soft target for terrorism. The scientists at Plum
Island need to recognize that their laboratory needs an overhaul, and
our elected leaders need to force real change there, before we all
have to pay the price.
Michael Christopher Carroll is the author of "Lab 257: The Disturbing
Story of the Government's Secret Plum Island Germ Laboratory."
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